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CHAP. X.] THE MIND KNOWS ITS OWN SUBSTANCE. 257 some other corporeal thing, which they think to be the mind ; but that the understanding is in this corporeal thing as its quality, so that this corporeal thing is the subject, but the understanding is in the subject, viz. that the mind is the subject, which they rule to be a corporeal thing, but the understanding, or any other of those things whichwe have mentioned as certain to us, is in that subject. They also hold nearly the same opinion who deny the mind itself to be body, but think it to be the combination or tempering together of the body ; for there is this difference, that the former say that the mind itself is the substance, in which the understanding is, as in a subject; but the latter say that the mind itself is in a subject, viz. in the body, of which it is the combination cr tempering together. And hence,by consequence,what else can they think, except that the understanding also is in the same body as in a subject ? 16. And all these do not perceive that the mind knows itself, even when it seeks for itself, as we have already shown. But nothing is at all rightly said to be known while its sub- stance is notknown. And therefore,when the mind knows itself, it knows its own substance ; and when, it is certain about itself, it is certain about its own substance. But it is certain about itself, as those things which are said above prove convincingly ; although it is not at all certain whether itself is air, or fire, or some body, or some function of body. Therefore it is not any of these. And thatwhole which is bidden toknow itself,belongs to this, that it is certain that it is not any of those things of which it is uncertain, and is certain that it is that only, which only it is certain that it is. For it thinks in this way of fire, or air, and whatever else of the body it thinks of. Neither can it in any way be brought to pass that it should so think that which itself is, as it thinks that which itself is not. Since it thinks all these things through an imaginary phantasy, whether fire, or air, or this or that body, or that part or com- bination and tempering together of the body : nor assuredly is it said to be all those things, but some one of them. But if it were any one of them, it would think this one in a different manner from the rest, viz. not through an imaginary phantasy, as absent things are thought,which either themselves or some of like kind have been touched by the bodily sense ; but by some DE TKIN. K

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