But one might find fault with
him, I think, before coming to all this. If, that is, any one else,
previously unaccustomed to discussion and unversed in logical
expression, delivered his ideas in this chance fashion, some indulgence
might be shown him for not using the recognized methods for
establishing his views. But considering that Eunomius has such an
abundance of this power, that he can advance by his
‘irresistible’ method καταληπτικῆς
ἐφόδου—ἡ κατάληψις. These words are taken from the Stoic logic, and refer to
the Stoic view of the standard of truth. To the question, How are true
perceptions distinguished from false ones, the Stoics answered, that a
true perception is one which represents a real object as it really is.
To the further question, How may it be known that a perception
faithfully represents a reality, they replied by pointing to a relative
not an absolute test—the degree of strength with which certain
perceptions force themselves upon our notice. Some of our
perceptions are of such a kind that they at once oblige us to bestow on
them assent. Such perceptions produce in us that strength of conviction
which the Stoics call a conception. Whenever a perception forces itself
upon us in this irresistible form, we are no longer dealing with a
fiction of the imagination but with something real. The test of
irresistibility (κατάληψις) was, in the first place, understood to apply to
sensations from without, such sensations, according to the Stoic view,
alone supplying the material for knowledge. An equal degree of
certainty was, however, attached to terms deduced from originally true
data, either by the universal and natural exercise of thought, or by
scientific processes of proof. It is καταλέψεις
obtained in this last way that Gregory refers to, and
Eunomius was endeavouring to create in the supra-natural
world. of proof even
into the supra-natural, how can he be ignorant of the starting-point from
which this ‘irresistible’ perception of a hidden truth
takes its rise in all these logical excursions. Every one knows that
all such arguing must start from plain and well-known truths, to compel
belief through itself in still doubtful truths: and that none of these
last can be grasped without the guidance of what is obvious leading us
towards the unknown. If on the other hand that which is adopted to
start with for the illustration of this unknown is at variance with
universal belief, it will be a long time before the unknown will
receive any illustration from it.