The idea of the whole transaction of the Supper as a
sacrifice, is plainly found in the Didache, (c. 14), in
Ignatius, and above all, in Justin (I. 65f.) But even Clement of
Rome presupposes it, when (in cc. 40–44) he draws a parallel
between bishops and deacons and the Priests and Levites of the Old Testament,
describing as the chief function of the former (44.4) προσφέρειν
τὰ δῶρα. This is not the
place to enquire whether the first celebration had, in the mind of its
founder, the character of a sacrificial meal; but, certainly, the idea,
as it was already developed at the time of Justin, had been created by
the churches. Various reasons tended towards seeing in the Supper
a sacrifice. In the first place, Malachi i. 11, demanded a solemn Christian
sacrifice: see my notes on Didache, 14.3. In the
second place, all prayers were regarded as a sacrifice, and therefore
the solemn prayers at the Supper must be specially considered as
such. In the third place, the words of institution τοῦτο
ποιεῖτε, contained a command
with regard to a definite religious action. Such an action,
however, could only be represented as a sacrifice, and this the more,
that the Gentile Christians might suppose that they had to understand
ποιεῖν in the sense of
θύειν. In the fourth
place, payments in kind were necessary for the “agapæ”
connected with the Supper, out of which were taken the bread and wine
for the Holy celebration; in what other aspect could these offerings in
the worship be regarded than as προσφοραί
for the purpose of a sacrifice? Yet the spiritual idea so
prevailed that only the prayers were regarded as the θυσία proper, even in
the case of Justin (Dial. 117). The elements are only
δῶρα,
προσφοραί, which
obtain their value from the prayers, in which thanks are given for the
gifts of creation and redemption, as well as for the holy meal, and
entreaty is made for the introduction of the community into the Kingdom
of God (see Didache, 9. 10). Therefore, even the sacred
meal itself is called εὐχαριστία
(Justin, Apol. I. 66: ἡ τροφὴ
αὕτη
καλεῖται
παρ᾽ ἡμῖν
εὐχαριστία
. Didache, 9. 1: Ignat.), because it is τραφὴ
εὐχαριστηθεῖσα.
It is a mistake to suppose that Justin already understood the body of
Christ to be the object of ποιεῖν, Harnack seems to know only
the printed (and almost certainly incorrect) reading of the modern
texts of the I. Apology (Chapter LXVI) where τοῦτο
ἐστι has taken the place of τούτεστι.
The passage did read, τοῦτο
ποιεῖτε, εἰς
τὴν
ἀνάμνησίν
μου, τούτεστι
τὸ σῶμά μου; in
which it is evident that the words “my body” are in
apposition with τοῦτο and the object of
ποιεῖτε, which has
its sacrificial sense “to offer,” as in the Dialogue with
Trypho, ὁ
κύριος ἡμῶν
παρέδωκε
ποιεῖν (chapter xlj). and
therefore thought of a sacrifice of this body (I. 66). The real
sacrificial act in the Supper consists rather, according to Justin,
only in the εὐχαριστίαν
ποιεῖν whereby the κοινὸς
ἄρτος becomes the ἄρτος τῆς
εὐχαριστίας
. Harnack evidently does
not fully appreciate the Catholic doctrine of the Sacrifice in the Holy
Eucharist. No catholic theologian teaches that the essence of
that sacrifice is to offer up the already present Body of Christ, but
that the essence of the Sacrifice is the act of consecration; the
“making the Eucharistic Sacrifice,” as he accurately says,
“whereby the common bread becomes the Bread of the
Eucharist.” Harnack says truly that “the sacrificial
act of the Christian here also is nothing else than an act of
prayer,” but he does not seem to know that this is the Catholic
doctrine to-day, nor to appreciate at its Catholic value the
“Prayer of Consecration.” The act of consecration is
the essence of the Christian Sacrifice according to the teaching of all
Catholics. The sacrifice of the Supper in its
essence, apart from the offering of alms, which in the practice of the
Church was closely united with it, is nothing but a sacrifice of
prayer: the sacrificial act of the Christian here also is nothing
else than an act of prayer (See Apol. I. 14, 65–67;
Dial. 28, 29, 41, 70, 116–118).