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Letter VII.
(a.d. 389.)
To Nebridius Augustin Sends Greeting.
Chap. I.—Memory may be exercised independently of such images as are presented by
the imagination.
1. I shall dispense with a formal preface, and to the subject on which you have for some
time wished to hear my opinion I shall address myself at once; and this I do the more will-
ingly, because the statement must take some time.
It seems to you that there can be no exercise of memory without images, or the appre-
hension of some objects presented by the imagination, which you have been pleased to call
“phantasiæ.” For my part, I entertain a different opinion. In the first place, we must observe
that the things which we remember are not always things which are passing away, but are
for the most part things which are permanent. Wherefore, seeing that the function of memory
is to retain hold of what belongs to time past, it is certain that it embraces on the one hand
things which leave us, and on the other hand things from which we go away. When, for ex-
ample, I remember my father, the object which memory recalls is one which has left me,
and is now no more; but when I remember Carthage, the object is in this case one which
still exists, and which I have left. In both cases, however, memory retains what belongs to
past time. For I remember that man and this city, not by seeing them now, but by having
seen them in the past.
2. You perhaps ask me at this point, Why bring forward these facts? And you may do
this the more readily, because you observe that in both the examples quoted the object re-
membered can come to my memory in no other way than by the apprehension of such an
image as you affirm to be always necessary. For my purpose it suffices meanwhile to have
proved in this way that memory can be spoken of as embracing also those things which have
not yet passed away: and now mark attentively how this supports my opinion. Some men
raise a groundless objection to that most famous theory invented by Socrates, according to
which the things that we learn are not introduced to our minds as new, but brought back
to memory by a process of recollection; supporting their objection by affirming that memory
has to do only with things which have passed away, whereas, as Plato himself has taught,
those things which we learn by the exercise of the understanding are permanent, and being
imperishable, cannot be numbered among things which have passed away: the mistake into
which they have fallen arising obviously from this, that they do not consider that it is only
the mental act of apprehension by which we have discerned these things which belongs to
the past; and that it is because we have, in the stream of mental activity, left these behind,
and begun in a variety of ways to attend to other things, that we require to return to them
by an effort of recollection, that is, by memory. If, therefore, passing over other examples,
we fix our thoughts upon eternity itself as something which is for ever permanent, and
To Nebridius
523
To Nebridius