stance, as the operation of the senses, the appetitive, or contrary, instinct of the man with
regard to anything, and other generally acknowledged accompaniments of his nature, none
of which a particular epoch has introduced amongst those born in it; but our humanity is
preserved continually, from first to last, within the same circle of qualities, losing none which
it had at the beginning, any more than it acquires any which it had not then. But just as,
while sight is a faculty common to our nature, scientific observation comes by training to
those who have devoted themselves to some science (it is not every one, for instance, who
can observe with the theodolite, or prove a theorem by means of lines in geometry, or do
anything else, where art has introduced, not mere sight, but a special use of sight), so too,
while one might pronounce the possession of reason to be a common property of humanity
united to the very essence of our nature from above, the invention of terms significative of
realities is the work of men who, possessing from above the power of reason, are continually
finding out, according as they wish for them towards the elucidation of that which they
plainly see, certain words expressive of these things. “But if these views are to prevail,” says
he, “one of two things is proved; either that conception is anterior to those who conceive,
or that the names naturally befitting the Deity, and pre-existent to everything, are posterior
to the beginning of man.” Ought we to continue the fight against such assertions, and join
issue with such manifest absurdity?
306
But who, pray, is so simple as to be harmed by such arguments, and to imagine that if
names are once believed to be an outcome of the reasoning faculty, he must allow that the
utterance of names is anterior to those who utter them, or else that he must think he is sinning
against the Deity, in that every man continues to name the Deity, according as each after
birth is capable of conceiving Him? As to this last supposition, it has been already explained
that the Supreme Being has no need Himself of words as delivered by a voice and a tongue;
and it would be superfluous to repeat what would only encumber the argument. In fine, a
Being Whose nature is neither lacking nor redundant, but simply perfect, neither fails to
possess anything that is necessary, nor possesses what is not necessary. Since, then, we have
proved previously, and all thinking men unanimously agree, that the calling by names is
not a necessity of the Deity, no one can deny the extreme profanity of thus assigning to Him
what is not a necessity.
But I do not think that we need linger on this, nor minutely examine that which follows.
To the more attentive reader, the argument elaborated by our opponent will itself appear
in the light of a special pleader on the side of orthodoxy. He says, for instance, that imper-
ishability and immortality are the very essence of the Deity. For my part I see no need to
contend with him, no matter whether these qualities aforesaid only accrue to the Deity, or
whether they are, by virtue of their signification, His essence; whichever of these two views
is adopted, it will completely support our argument. For if the being imperishable only ac-
crues to the essence, the not being generated will also most certainly only accrue to it; and
572
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.