But in speaking of
“cause,” and “of the cause,” we do not by these
words denote nature (for no one would give the same definition of
“cause” and of “nature”), but we indicate the
difference in manner of existence. For when we say that one is
“caused,” and that the other is “without
cause,” we do not divide the nature by the word “cause The
Paris Edit. omits αιτιον.”, but only indicate the fact that the
Son does not exist without generation, nor the Father by generation:
but we must needs in the first place believe that something exists, and
then scrutinize the manner of existence of the object of our belief:
thus the question of existence is one, and that of the mode of
existence is another. To say that anything exists without generation
sets forth the mode of its existence, but what exists is not indicated
by this phrase. If one were to ask a husbandman about a tree, whether
it were planted or had grown of itself, and he were to answer either
that the tree had not been planted or that it was the result of
planting, would he by that answer declare the nature of the tree?
Surely not; but while saying how it exists he would leave the question
of its nature obscure and unexplained. So, in the other case, when we
learn that He is unbegotten, we are taught in what mode He exists, and
how it is fit that we should conceive Him as existing, but what
He is we do not hear in that phrase. When, therefore, we acknowledge
such a distinction in the case of the Holy Trinity, as to believe that
one Person is the Cause, and another is of the Cause, we can no longer
be accused of confounding the definition of the Persons by the
community of nature.