view, cannot affect the mind at all. It is most evident, that nothing is in the mind, or reaches
it, or takes any hold of it, any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of.
And I think it must also be allowed by all, that every thing that is properly called a
motive, excitement, or inducement to a perceiving, willing agent, has some sort and degree
of tendency, or advantage to move or excite the Will, previous to the effect, or to the act of
the Will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I call the strength of the
motive. That motive which has a less degree of previous advantage, or tendency to move
the Will, or which appears less inviting, as it stands in the view of the mind, is what I call a
weaker motive. On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears
concerning it to the understanding or apprehension, the greatest degree of previous tendency
to excite and induce the choice, is what I call the strongest motive. And in this sense, I suppose
the Will is always determined by the strongest motive.
Things that exist in the view of the mind have their strength, tendency, or advantage to
move, or excite its Will, from many things appertaining to the nature and circumstances of
the thing viewed, the nature and circumstances of the mind that views, and the degree and
manner of its view; of which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect enumeration. But
so much I think may be determined in general, without room for controversy, that whatever
is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature
and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or viewed as good; nor has it
any tendency to engage the election of the soul in any further degree than it appears such.
For to say otherwise, would be to say, that things that appear, have a tendency, by the ap-
pearance they make, to engage the mind to elect them, some other way than by their appear-
ing eligible to it; which is absurd. And therefore it must be true, in some sense, that the Will
always is, as the greatest apparent good is. But only, for the right understanding of this, two
things must be well and distinctly observed.
1. It must be observed in what sense I use the term “good;” namely, as of the same import
with “agreeable.” To appear good to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to appear
agreeable, or seem pleasing to the mind. Certainly, nothing appears inviting and eligible to
the mind, or tending to engage its inclination and choice, considered as evil or disagreeable;
nor indeed, as indifferent, and neither agreeable nor disagreeable. But if it tends to draw the
inclination, and move the Will, it must be under the notion of that which suits the mind.
And therefore that must have the greatest tendency to attract and engage it, which as it
stands in the mind’s view, suits it best, and pleases it most; and in that sense, is the greatest
apparent good: to say otherwise, is little, if any thing, short of a direct and plain contradiction.
The word “good,” in this sense, includes in its signification, the removal or avoiding of
evil, or of that which is disagreeable and uneasy. It is agreeable and pleasing, to avoid what
is disagreeable and displeasing, and to have uneasiness removed. So that here is included
what Mr. Locke supposes determines the Will. For when he speaks of “uneasiness,” as de-
522
SECTION II. Concerning the Determination of the Will.