Now at this point it seems right
to put forward once more our accuser’s statement in support of
our own defence. We shall therefore repeat word for word the statement
laid down by him, which supports our argument as
follows:—“The blessed John,” he says, “teaches
us that God the Word, by Whom all things were made, has become
incarnate, saying ‘And the Word was made flesh.’”
Does he understand what he is writing when he adds this to his own
argument? I can hardly myself think that the same man can at once be
aware of the meaning of these words and contend against our statement.
For if any one examines the words carefully, he will find that there is
no mutual conflict between what is said by us and what is said by him.
For we both consider the dispensation in the flesh apart, and regard
the Divine power in itself: and he, in like manner with ourselves, says
that the Word that was in the beginning has been manifested in the
flesh: yet no one ever charged him, nor does he charge himself, with
preaching “two Words”, Him Who was in the beginning, and
Him Who was made flesh; for he knows, surely, that the Word is
identical with the Word, He who appeared in the flesh with Him Who was
with God. But the flesh was not identical with the Godhead, till this
too was transformed to the Godhead, so that of necessity one set of
attributes befits God the Word, and a different set of attributes
befits the “form of the servant This
statement would seem to imply that, at some time after the Incarnation,
the Humanity of Christ was transformed to the Divine Nature, and made
identical with It. From other passages in what has preceded, it would
seem that this change in the mutual relation of the two Natures might,
according to the words of S. Gregory, be conceived as taking place
after the Passion. Thus it might be said that S. Gregory
conceived the union of the two Natures to be, since the Passion (or,
more strictly, since the “exaltation”), what the
Monophysites conceived it to be from the moment of the Incarnation. But
other phrases, again, seem to show that he conceived the two Natures
still to remain distinct (see note 4 inf.). There is, however,
ample justification in S. Gregory’s language for the remark of
Bp. Hefele, that S. Gregory “cannot entirely free himself from
the notion of a transmutation of the Human Nature into the
Divine.” (Hefele, Hist. of the Councils, Eng. Trans. vol.
iii. p. 4.).” If,
then, in view of such a confession, he does not reproach himself with
the duality of Words, why are we falsely charged with dividing the
object of our faith into “two Christs”?—we, who say
that He Who was highly exalted after His Passion, was made Lord and
Christ by His union ἑνωσέως. with Him Who is
verily Lord and Christ, knowing by what we have learnt that the Divine
Nature is always one and the same, and with the same mode of existence,
while the flesh in itself is that which reason and sense apprehend
concerning it, but when mixed ἀνακραθεῖσα
πρὸς τὸ
θεῖον. with the Divine no
longer remains in its own limitations and properties, but is taken up
to that which is overwhelming and transcendent. Our contemplation,
however, of the respective properties of the flesh and of the Godhead
remains free from confusion, so long as each of these is contemplated
by itself Here S.
Gregory seems to state accurately the differentiation of the two
Natures, while he recognizes the possibility of the communicatio
idiomatum: but it is not clear that he would acknowledge that the
two Natures still remain distinct. Even this, however, seems to
be implied in his citation of Phil. ii. 11, at a later
point., as, for example, “the Word was
before the ages, but the flesh came into being in the last
times”: but one could not reverse this statement, and say that
the latter is pretemporal, or that the Word has come into being in the
last times. The flesh is of a passible, the Word of an operative
nature: and neither is the flesh capable of making the things that are,
nor is the power possessed by the Godhead capable of suffering. The
Word was in
the beginning with God, the man was subject to the trial of death; and
neither was the Human Nature from everlasting, nor the Divine Nature
mortal: and all the rest of the attributes are contemplated in the same
way. It is not the Human Nature that raises up Lazarus, nor is it the
power that cannot suffer that weeps for him when he lies in the grave:
the tear proceeds from the Man, the life from the true Life. It is not
the Human Nature that feeds the thousands, nor is it omnipotent might
that hastens to the fig-tree. Who is it that is weary with the journey,
and Who is it that by His word made all the world subsist? What is the
brightness of the glory, and what is that that was pierced with the
nails? What form is it that is buffeted in the Passion, and what form
is it that is glorified from everlasting? So much as this is clear,
(even if one does not follow the argument into detail,) that the blows
belong to the servant in whom the Lord was, the honours to the Lord
Whom the servant compassed about, so that by reason of contact and the
union of Natures the proper attributes of each belong to both Here is
truly stated the ground of the communicatio idiomatum: while the
illustrations following seem to show that S. Gregory recognized this
communicatio as existing at the time of our Lord’s
humiliation, and as continuing to exist after His
“exaltation”; that he acknowledged, that is, the union of
the two Natures before the “exaltation,” and the
distinction of the two Natures after that event., as the Lord receives the stripes of the
servant, while the servant is glorified with the honour of the Lord;
for this is why the Cross is said to be the Cross of the Lord of
glory 1 Cor. ii. 8., and why every tongue confesses that Jesus
Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father Phil. ii. 11..