Chapter LXIX.
Celsus continues in his usual manner, asserting that “to change a nature entirely is ex-
ceedingly difficult.” We, however, who know of only one nature in every rational soul, and
who maintain that none has been created evil by the Author of all things, but that many
have become wicked through education, and perverse example, and surrounding influences,
3648 so that wickedness has been naturalized 3649 in some individuals, are persuaded that
for the word of God to change a nature in which evil has been naturalized is not only not
impossible, but is even a work of no very great difficulty, if a man only believe that he must
entrust himself to the God of all things, and do everything with a view to please Him with
whom it cannot be 3650 that
“Both good and bad are in the same honour,
Or that the idle man and he who laboured much
Perish alike.” 3651
But even if it be exceedingly difficult to effect a change in some persons, the cause must
be held to lie in their own will, which is reluctant to accept the belief that the God over all
things is a just Judge of all the deeds done during life. For deliberate choice and practice
3652 avail much towards the accomplishment of things which appear to be very difficult,
and, to speak hyperbolically, almost impossible. Has the nature of man, when desiring to
walk along a rope extended in the air through the middle of the theatre, and to carry at the
same time numerous and heavy weights, been able by practice and attention to accomplish
such a feat; but when desiring to live in conformity with the practice of virtue, does it find
it impossible to do so, although formerly it may have been exceedingly wicked? See
whether he who holds such views does not bring a charge against the nature of the Creator
of the rational animal 3653 rather than against the creature, if He has formed the nature of
man with powers for the attainment of things of such difficulty, and of no utility whatever,
but has rendered it incapable of securing its own blessedness. But these remarks may suffice
as an answer to the assertion that “entirely to change a nature is exceedingly difficult.” He
alleges, in the next place, that “they who are without sin are partakers of a better life;” not
making it clear what he means by “those who are without sin,” whether those who are so
from the beginning (of their lives), or those who become so by a transformation. Of those
who were so from the beginning of their lives, there cannot possibly be any; while those
3648 παρὰ τὰς ἀνατροφὰς, καὶ τὰς διαστροφὰς, καὶ τὰς περιηχήσεις.
3649 φυσιωθῆναι.
3650 [ παρ᾽ ὧ οὐκ ἔστιν. S.]
3651 Cf. Iliad, ix. 319, 320.
3652 προαίρεσις καὶ ασκησις.
3653 τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου.
Chapter LXIX
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Chapter LXIX