Chapter VIII.—Test of
Truth.
“And it is by no means that which is true,
but that which is pleasing, which persuades every one who seeks to
learn from himself. Since, therefore, one thing is pleasing to
one, and another to another, one thing prevails over one as truth, and
another thing over another. But the truth is that which is
approved by the Prophet, not that which is pleasant to each
individual. For that which is one would be many, if the pleasing
were the true; which is impossible. Wherefore also the Grecian
philologers—rather than philosophers
921
—going about matters by conjectures,
have dogmatized much and diversely, thinking that the apt sequence of
hypotheses is truth, not knowing that when they have assigned to
themselves false beginnings, their conclusion has corresponded with the
beginning.
921
φιλόλογοι,
οὐ
φιλόσοφοι
,
“lovers of words, not lovers of wisdom.”