refuse this consent. And yet this evil, to which prudence teaches and temperance enables
us not to consent, is removed from this life neither by prudence nor by temperance. And
justice, whose office it is to render to every man his due, whereby there is in man himself a
certain just order of nature, so that the soul is subjected to God, and the flesh to the soul,
and consequently both soul and flesh to God,—does not this virtue demonstrate that it is
as yet rather laboring towards its end than resting in its finished work? For the soul is so
much the less subjected to God as it is less occupied with the thought of God; and the flesh
is so much the less subjected to the spirit as it lusts more vehemently against the spirit. So
long, therefore, as we are beset by this weakness, this plague, this disease, how shall we dare
to say that we are safe? and if not safe, then how can we be already enjoying our final
beatitude? Then that virtue which goes by the name of fortitude is the plainest proof of the
ills of life, for it is these ills which it is compelled to bear patiently. And this holds good, no
matter though the ripest wisdom co-exists with it. And I am at a loss to understand how
the Stoic philosophers can presume to say that these are no ills, though at the same time
they allow the wise man to commit suicide and pass out of this life if they become so grievous
that he cannot or ought not to endure them. But such is the stupid pride of these men who
fancy that the supreme good can be found in this life, and that they can become happy by
their own resources, that their wise man, or at least the man whom they fancifully depict as
such, is always happy, even though he become blind, deaf, dumb, mutilated, racked with
pains, or suffer any conceivable calamity such as may compel him to make away with himself;
and they are not ashamed to call the life that is beset with these evils happy. O happy life,
which seeks the aid of death to end it? If it is happy, let the wise man remain in it; but if
these ills drive him out of it, in what sense is it happy? Or how can they say that these are
not evils which conquer the virtue of fortitude, and force it not only to yield, but so to rave
that it in one breath calls life happy and recommends it to be given up? For who is so blind
as not to see that if it were happy it would not be fled from? And if they say we should flee
from it on account of the infirmities that beset it, why then do they not lower their pride
and acknowledge that it is miserable? Was it, I would ask, fortitude or weakness which
prompted Cato to kill himself? for he would not have done so had he not been too weak to
endure Cæsar’s victory. Where, then, is his fortitude? It has yielded, it has succumbed, it
has been so thoroughly overcome as to abandon, forsake, flee this happy life. Or was it no
longer happy? Then it was miserable. How, then, were these not evils which made life
miserable, and a thing to be escaped from?
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And therefore those who admit that these are evils, as the Peripatetics do, and the Old
Academy, the sect which Varro advocates, express a more intelligible doctrine; but theirs
also is a surprising mistake, for they contend that this is a happy life which is beset by these
evils, even though they be so great that he who endures them should commit suicide to escape
them. “Pains and anguish of body,” says Varro, “are evils, and so much the worse in propor-
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What the Christians Believe Regarding the Supreme Good and Evil, in Opposition…