been opportunity for thorough deliberation. But this will be to plunge directly into the
grossest nonsense: for it is the act of suspension itself that we are speaking of; and there is
no room for a space of deliberation and suspension in order to determine whether we will
suspend or no. For that supposes, that even suspension itself may be deferred: which is ab-
surd; for the very deferring the determination of suspension, to consider whether we will
suspend or no, will be actually suspending. For during the space of suspension, to consider
whether to suspend, the act is, ipso facto, suspended. There is no medium between suspending
to act, and immediately acting; and therefore no possibility of avoiding either the one or
the other one moment.
And besides, this is attended with ridiculous absurdity another way: for now, it seems,
Liberty consists wholly in the mind having power to suspend its determination whether to
suspend or no; that there may be time for consideration, whether it be best to suspend. And
if Liberty consists in this only, then this is the Liberty under consideration. We have to inquire
now, how Liberty, with respect to this act of suspending a determination of suspension,
consists in Indifference, or how Indifference is essential to it. The answer, according to the
hypothesis we are upon, must be, that it consists in a power of suspending even this last-
mentioned act, to have time to consider whether to suspend that. And then the same diffi-
culties and inquiries return over again with respect to that; and so on for ever. Which, if it
would show any thing, would show only that there is no such thing as a free act. It drives
the exercise of freedom back in infinitum; and that is to drive it out of the world.
And besides all this, there is a delusion, and a latent gross contradiction in the affair
another way; inasmuch as in explaining how, or in what respect, the Will is free, with regard
to a particular act of volition, it is said, that its Liberty consists in a power to determine to
suspend that act, which places Liberty not in that act of volition which the inquiry is about,
but altogether in another antecedent act. Which contradicts the thing supposed in both the
question and answer. The question is, wherein consists the mind’s Liberty in any particular
act of volition? And the answer, in pretending to show wherein lies the mind’s Liberty in
that act, in effect says, it does not lie in that act at all, but in another, viz. a volition to suspend
that act. And therefore the answer is both contradictory, and altogether impertinent and
beside the purpose. For it does not show wherein the Liberty of the Will consists in the act
in question; instead of that, it supposes it does not consist in that act at all, but in another
distinct from it, even a volition to suspend that act, and take time to consider of it. And no
account is pretended to be given wherein the mind is free with respect to that act, wherein
this answer supposes the Liberty of the mind indeed consists, viz. the act of suspension, or
of determining the suspension.
On the whole, it is exceeding manifest, that the Liberty of the mind does not consist in
Indifference, and that Indifference is not essential or necessary to it, or at all belonging to
it, as the Arminians suppose; that opinion being full of nothing but self-contradiction.
573
SECTION VII. Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference.…