But that Athanasius held the essential
rationality and immortality of the soul is absolutely clear, if only
from c. Gent. 32 and 33. We have, then, to find an explanation
of his language in the present treatise. With regard to immortality, it
should be observed (1) that the language employed (in 4. 5, where κενωθῆναι
τοῦ εἶναι
ἀεί is explained by τὸ
διαλυθέντας
μένειν ἐν τῷ
θανάτῳ καὶ
τῇ φθόρᾳ) suggests a
continued condition, and therefore something short of
annihilation, although not worthy of the name of existence or
life,—(2) that even in the worst of men the image of God is
defaced, but not effaced (14. 1, &c.), and that even when grace is
lost (7. 4), man cannot be as though the contact with the divine had
never taken place;—(3) that in this work, as by St. Paul in 1 Cor. xv., the final destiny of the wicked is
passed over (but for the general reference 56. 3) in silence. It may be
added (4) that Athanasius puts together all that separates man
from irrational creatures without clearly drawing the line between what
belongs to the natural man and what to the κατ᾽ εἰκόνα
χάρις. The subject of eschatology is
nowhere dealt with in full by Athanasius; while it is quite certain
(c. Gent. 33) that he did not share the inclination of some
earlier writers (see D.C.B. ii. p. 192) toward the idea of conditional
immortality, there is also no reason to think that he held with the
Universalism of Origen, Gregory of Nyssa and others (see Migne, Patr.
Gr. xxvii. p. 1404 A, also 1384 C, where ‘the unfortunate
Origen’s’ opinions seem to be rejected, but with an implied
deprecation of harsh judgment). As to his view of the essential
rationality of man (see c. Gent. 32) the consideration (4) urged
above once more applies (compare the discussion in Harnack, Dg.
ii. 146 sqq.). Yet he says that man left to himself can have no idea of
God at all (11. 1), and that this would deprive him of any claim to be
considered a rational being (ib. 2). The apparent inconsistency is
removed if we understand that man may be rational potentially (as all
men are) and yet not rational in the sense of exercising reason (which
is the case with very many). In other words, grace gives not the
faculty itself, but its integrity, the latter being the result not of
the mere psychological existence of the faculty, but of the reaction
upon it of its highest and adequate object. (The same is true to a
great extent of the doctrine of πνεῦμα in the New
Testament.)