wherein it must of necessity, according to the nature of things, be as likely to commit them,
as to refrain from them; where is the exceeding heinousness of choosing and committing
them? If there be no harm in often being in such a state, where in the probability of doing
and forbearing are exactly equal, there being an equilibrium, and no more tendency to one
than the other; then, according to the nature and laws of such a contingence, it may be ex-
pected, as an inevitable consequence of such a disposition of things, that we should choose
them as often as reject them: that it should generally so fall out is necessary, as equality in
the effect is the natural consequence of the equal tendency of the cause, or of the antecedent
state of things from which the effect arises. Why then should we be so exceedingly to blame,
if it does so fall out?
It is many ways apparent, that the Arminian scheme of Liberty is utterly inconsistent
with the being of any such things as either virtuous or vicious habits or dispositions. If
Liberty of Indifference be essential to moral Agency, then there can be no Virtue in any ha-
bitual inclinations of the heart; which are contrary to Indifference, and imply in their nature
the very destruction and exclusion of it. They suppose nothing can be virtuous in which no
Liberty is exercised; but how absurd is it to talk of exercising Indifference under bias and
preponderation!
And if self-determining power in the Will be necessary to moral Agency, praise, blame,
&c. then nothing done by the Will can be any further praiseworthy or blameworthy, than
so far as the Will is moved, swayed, and determined by itself, and the scales turned by the
sovereign power the Will has over itself. And therefore the Will must not be out of its balance,
preponderation must not be determined and effected before-hand; and so the self-determ-
ining act anticipated. Thus it appears another way, that habitual bias is inconsistent with
that Liberty, which Arminians suppose to be necessary to Virtue or Vice; and so it follows,
that habitual bias itself cannot be either virtuous or vicious.
The same thing follows from their doctrine concerning the Inconsistence of Necessity
with Liberty, praise, dispraise, &c. None will deny, that bias and inclination may be so strong
as to be invincible, and leave no possibility of the Will determining contrary to it; and so be
attended with Necessity. This Dr. Whitby allows concerning the Will of God, angels, and
glorified saints, with respect to good; and the Will of devils, with respect to evil. Therefore,
if Necessity be inconsistent with Liberty; then, when fixed inclination is to such a degree of
strength, it utterly excludes all Virtue, Vice, praise, or blame. And, if so, then the nearer
habits are to this strength, the more do they impede Liberty, and so diminish praise and
blame. If very strong habits destroy Liberty, the lesser ones proportionably hinder it, accord-
ing to their degree of strength. And therefore it will follow, that then is the act most virtuous
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SECTION VI. Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue,…