preme object of our respect. For it exalts its private object above the other great and infinite
object; and sets that up as supreme, in opposition to this. It puts down being in general,
which is infinitely superior in itself, and infinitely more important, in an inferior place; yea,
subjects the supreme general object to this private infinitely inferior object: which is to treat
it with great contempt, and truly to act in opposition to it, and to act in opposition to the
true order of things, and in opposition to that which is infinitely the supreme interest;
making this supreme and infinitely important interest, as far as in us lies, to be subject to,
and dependent on, an interest infinitely inferior. This is to act the part of an enemy to it.
He that takes a subject, and exalts him above his prince, sets him as supreme instead of the
prince, and treats his prince wholly as a subject, therein acts the part of an enemy to his
prince.
From these things, I think, it is manifest, that no affection limited to any private system,
not depending on nor subordinate to being in general, can be of the nature of true virtue;
and this, whatever the private system be, let it be more or less extensive, consisting of a
greater or smaller number of individuals, so long as it contains an infinitely little part of
universal existence, and so bears no proportion to the great all-comprehending system. And
consequently, that no affection whatsoever to any creature, or any system of created beings,
which is not dependent on, nor subordinate to, a propensity or union of the heart to God,
the supreme and infinite Being, can be of the nature of true virtue.
From hence also it is evident, that the divine virtue, or the virtue of the divine mind,
must consist primarily in love to himself, or in the mutual love and friendship which subsists
eternally and necessarily between the several persons in the Godhead, or that infinitely
strong propensity there is in these divine persons one to another. There is no need of mul-
tiplying words, to prove that it must be thus, on a supposition that virtue, in its most essential
nature, consists in benevolent affection or propensity of heart towards being in general; and
so flowing out to particular beings, in a greater or lesser degree, according to the measure
127
of existence and beauty which they are possessed of. It will also follow, from the foregoing
things, that God’s goodness and love to created beings, is derived from and subordinate to
his love to himself. 230
With respect to the manner in which a virtuous love in created beings, one to another,
is dependent on, and derived from love to God, this will appear by a proper consideration
of what has been said; that it is sufficient to render love to any created being, virtuous, if it
arise from the temper of mind wherein consists a disposition to love God supremely. Because
it appears from what has been already observed, all that love to particular beings, which is
the fruit of a benevolent propensity of heart to being in general, is virtuous love. But, as has
230 In what manner it is so, I have endeavoured in some measure to explain in the preceding discourse of
God’s end in creating the world.
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CHAPTER II. How love respects different beings.