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that he infinitely exceeds all other beings in these. If the Deity is to be looked upon as
within that system of beings which properly terminates our benevolence, or belonging to
that whole, certainly he is to be regarded as the head of the system, and the chief part of it:
if it be proper to call him a part, who is infinitely more than all the rest, and in comparison
of whom, and without whom, all the rest are nothing, either as to beauty or existence. And
therefore certainly, unless we will be atheists, we must allow that true virtue does primarily
and most essentially consist in a supreme love to God; and that where this is wanting, there
can be no true virtue.
But this being a matter of the highest importance, I shall say something further to make
it plain, that love to God is most essential to true virtue; and that no benevolence whatsoever
to other beings can be of the nature of true virtue without it.
And therefore, let it be supposed, that some beings, by natural instinct, or by some
other means, have a determination of mind to union and benevolence to a particular person,
or private system, 229 which is but a small part of the universal system of being: and that this
disposition or determination of mind is independent on, or not subordinate to, benevolence
to being in general. Such a determination, disposition, or affection of mind is not of the
nature of true virtue.
This is allowed by all with regard to self-love; in which good will is confined to one single
person only. And there are the same reasons why any other private affection or good will,
though extending to a society of persons independent of, and unsubordinate to, benevolence
to the universality, should not be esteemed truly virtuous. For, notwithstanding it extends
to a number of persons, which taken together are more than a single person, yet the whole
falls infinitely short of the universality of existence; and if put in the scales with it, has no
greater proportion to it than a single person.
However, it may not be amiss more particularly to consider the reasons why private
affections, or good will limited to a particular circle of beings, falling infinitely short of the
whole existence, and not dependent upon it, nor subordinate to general benevolence, cannot
be of the nature of true virtue.
1. Such a private affection, detached from general benevolence, and independent on it,
as the case may be, will be against general benevolence, or of a contrary tendency; and will
set a person against general existence, and make him an enemy to it. As it is with selfishness,
or when a man is governed by a regard to his own private interest, independent of regard
229 It may be here noted, that when hereafter, I use such a phrase as private system of being, or others similar,
I thereby intend any system or society of beings that contains but a small part of the great system, comprehending
the universality of existence. I think that may well be called a private system, which is but an infinitely small
part of this great whole we stand related to. I therefore also call that affection private affection, which is limited
to so narrow a circle: and that general affection or benevolence, which has being in general for its object.
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CHAPTER II. How love respects different beings.