consistent use of words; both that men should be consistent with themselves, and one with
another, in the use of them. But men cannot call any thing right or wrong, worthy or ill-
deserving, consistently, any other way than by calling things so, which truly deserve praise
or blame, i.e. things, wherein all things considered there is most uniformity in connecting
with them praise or blame. There is no other way in which they can use these terms consist-
ently with themselves. Thus if thieves or traitors may be angry with informers that bring
them to justice, and call their behaviour by odious names; yet herein they are inconsistent
with themselves; because, when they put themselves in the place of those who have injured
them, they approve the same things they condemn. And therefore, such are capable of being
convinced, that they apply these odious terms in an abusive manner. So, a nation that pro-
secutes an ambitious design of universal empire, by subduing other nations with fire and
sword, may affix terms, that signify the highest degrees of virtue, to the conduct of such as
show the most engaged, stable, resolute spirit in this affair, and do most of this bloody work.
But yet they are capable of being convinced, that they use these terms inconsistently, and
abuse language in it, and so having their mouths stopped. And not only will men use such
words inconsistently with themselves, but also with one another, by using them any otherwise
than to signify true merit or ill deserving, as before explained. For there is no way else
wherein men have any notion of good or ill desert, in which mankind in general can agree.
Mankind in general seem to suppose some general standard, or foundation in nature, for
an universal consistence in the use of the terms whereby they express moral good and evil;
which none can depart from but through error and mistake. This is evidently supposed in
all their disputes about right and wrong; and in all endeavours used to prove that any thing
is either good or evil, in a moral sense.
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CHAPTER VIII. Whether virtue be founded in sentiment.