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niAP XV. j CHRISTIAN RELIGION. 179 tiori of the s(^ul is to aspire after it ; and, therefore, the more a man studies to approach to God, the more he proves himself a rational creature. Some maintain that in man there are more souls than one, a sensitive and a rational one ; but notwithstand- ing some appearance of probability in what they adduce, yet, as there is nothing solid in their arguments, we must reject them, unless we are fond of tormenting ourselves with frivolous and useless things. They say that there is a great repugnancy between the organic motions and the rational part of the soul ; as though reason were not also at variance with itself, and some of its counsels were not in opposition to others, like hos- tile armies. But as this confusion proceeds from the depravity of nature, it affords no ground for concluding that there are two souls, because the faculties are not sufficiently harmonious with each other. But all curious discussion respecting the faculties themselves I leave to the philosophers ; a simple definition will suffice us for the edification of piety. I confess, mdeed, that the things which they teach are true, and not only entertaining to be known, but useful and well digested by them ; nor do I prohibit those who are desirous of learning from the study of them. I admit, then, in the first place, that there are five senses, which Plato would rather call organs, by which all objects are conveyed into a common sensory, as into a general repository ; that next follows the fancy or imagina- tion, which discerns the objects'^pprehended by the common sensory ; next reason, to which belongs universal judgment ; lastly, the understanding, which steadily and quietly contem- plates the objects revolved and considered by reason. And thus to the understanding, reason, and imagination, the three intellectual faculties of the SQid, correspond also the three ap- petitive ones— the \yill, whose place it is to choose those things which the understanding and reason propose to it ; the iras- cible faculty, which embraces the things offered to it by reason and imagination ; and the concujDigcible faculty, which ap- prehends the objects presented by the imagination and sensa- tion. Though these things are true, or at least probable, yet, since I fear that they will involve us in their obscurity rather than assist us, I think they ought to be omitted . If any one chooses to make a diriereni disiribution oi the powers of the soul, so as to call one appetitive, which, though void of reason in itself, obeys reason, if it be under the guidance of any other faculty ; and to call another intellective, which is itself a par- taker of reason ; I shall not much oppose it. Nor have I any wish to combat the sentiment ot Aristotle, that there are three principles of action— sensCj intellect, and appetite. But let us rather choose a division place(fwithin the comprehension of all, and which certainly cannot be sought in the philosophers

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