niAP XV. j CHRISTIAN RELIGION. 179
tiori of the s(^ul is to aspire after it ; and, therefore, the more a
man studies to approach to God, the more he proves himself a
rational creature. Some maintain that in man there are more
souls than one, a sensitive and a rational one ; but notwithstand-
ing some appearance of probability in what they adduce, yet, as
there is nothing solid in their arguments, we must reject them,
unless we are fond of tormenting ourselves with frivolous and
useless things. They say that there is a great repugnancy
between the organic motions and the rational part of the soul
;
as though reason were not also at variance with itself, and
some of its counsels were not in opposition to others, like hos-
tile armies. But as this confusion proceeds from the depravity
of nature, it affords no ground for concluding that there are
two souls, because the faculties are not sufficiently harmonious
with each other. But all curious discussion respecting the
faculties themselves I leave to the philosophers ; a simple
definition will suffice us for the edification of piety. I confess,
mdeed, that the things which they teach are true, and not only
entertaining to be known, but useful and well digested by
them ; nor do I prohibit those who are desirous of learning
from the study of them. I admit, then, in the first place, that
there are five senses, which Plato would rather call organs, by
which all objects are conveyed into a common sensory, as into
a general repository ; that next follows the fancy or imagina-
tion, which discerns the objects'^pprehended by the common
sensory ; next reason, to which belongs universal judgment
;
lastly, the understanding, which steadily and quietly contem-
plates the objects revolved and considered by reason. And
thus to the understanding, reason, and imagination, the three
intellectual faculties of the SQid, correspond also the three ap-
petitive ones— the \yill, whose place it is to choose those things
which the understanding and reason propose to it ; the iras-
cible faculty, which embraces the things offered to it by reason
and imagination ; and the concujDigcible faculty, which ap-
prehends the objects presented by the imagination and sensa-
tion. Though these things are true, or at least probable, yet,
since I fear that they will involve us in their obscurity rather
than assist us, I think they ought to be omitted . If any one
chooses to make a diriereni disiribution oi the powers of the
soul, so as to call one appetitive, which, though void of reason
in itself, obeys reason, if it be under the guidance of any other
faculty ; and to call another intellective, which is itself a par-
taker of reason ; I shall not much oppose it. Nor have I any
wish to combat the sentiment ot Aristotle, that there are three
principles of action— sensCj intellect, and appetite. But let us
rather choose a division place(fwithin the comprehension of
all, and which certainly cannot be sought in the philosophers