“It is somewhat singular, that many of the fashionable infidels have hit upon a definition of virtue which perfectly
coincides with that of certain metaphysical divines in America, first invented and defended by that most acute
reasoner, Jonathan Edwards. They both place virtue exclusively in a passion for the general good; or, as Mr.
Edwards expresses it, love to being in general: so that our love is always to be proportioned to the magnitude of
its object in the scale of being: which is liable to the objections I have already stated, as well as to many others
which the limits of this note will not permit me to enumerate. Let it suffice to remark, (1) That virtue, on these
principles, is an utter impossibility: for the system of being, comprehending the great Supreme, is infinite: and
therefore, to maintain the proper proportion, the force of particular attachment must be infinitely less than the
passion for the general good: but the limits of the human mind are not capable of any emotions so infinitely
different in degree. (2) since our views of the extent of the universe are capable of perpetual enlargement, admitting
the sum of existence is ever the same, we must return back at each step to diminish the strength of particular
affections, or they will become disproportionate: and consequently, on these principles, vicious: so that the
balance must be continually fluctuating, by the weights being taken out of one scale and put one into the other.
(3) If virtue consist exclusively in love to being in general, or attachment to the general good, the particular af-
fections are, to every purpose of virtue, useless, and even pernicious: for their immediate, nay, their necessary
tendency is to attract to their objects a proportion of attention which far exceeds their comparative value in the
general scale. To allege that the general good is promoted by them, will be of no advantage to the defence of this
system, but the contrary, by confessing that a greater sum of happiness is attained by a deviation from, than an
adherence to, its principles: unless its advocates mean by the love of being in general, the same thing as the
private affections, which is to confound all the distinctions of language, as well as all the operations of mind.
Let it be remembered we have no dispute respecting what is the ultimate end of virtue, which is allowed on both
sides to be the greatest sum of happiness in the universe. The question is merely what is virtue itself; or, in other
words, what are the means appointed for the attainment of that end? There is little doubt, from some parts of
Mr. Godwin’s work, entitled ‘Political Justice,’ as well as from his early habits of reading, that he was indebted
to Mr. Edwards for his principal arguments against the private affections; though, with a daring consistence, he
has pursued his principles to an extreme from which that most excellent man would have revolted with hor-
ror.—The fundamental error of the whole system arose, as I conceive, from a mistaken pursuit of simplicity:
from a wish to construct a moral system, without leaving sufficient scope for the infinite variety of moral phe-
nomena and mental combination; in consequence of which its advocates were induced to place virtue exclusively
in some one disposition of mind; and, since the passion for the general good is undeniably the noblest and most
extensive of all others, when it was once resolved to place virtue in any one thing, there remained little room to
hesitate which should be preferred. It might have been worth while to reflect, that in the natural world there are
two kinds of attraction; one, which holds several parts of individual bodies in contact; another, which maintains
the union of bodies themselves with the general system; and that, though the union in the former case is much
more intimate than in the latter, each is equally essential to the order of the world. Similar to this is the relation
which the public and private affections bear to each other, and their use in the moral system.” (Modern Infidelity
considered, p. 62, &c. Note, sixth edition.) On this note, so very uncongenial with the body of the work we were
going to say, as unseemly, when connected with the discourse, as a deforming wart on a fair countenance, justice
constrains us to make a few remarks. 1. “Singular” indeed would it be to find an Atheist, or an infidel, who
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CHAPTER VII. The reasons of many mistakes