little of what was done, than the whole. They were as absolutely free from being concerned
in that act partly, as they were wholly. And there is no reason to be brought, why one man’s
sin cannot be justly reckoned to another’s account, who was not then in being, in the whole
of it; but what will as properly lie against its being reckoned to him in any part, so as that
he should be subject to any condemnation or punishment on that account. If those reasons
are good, all the difference is this; that to bring a great punishment on infants for Adam’s
sin, is a great act of injustice, and to bring a comparatively smaller punishment, is a smaller
act of injustice; but not, that this is not as truly and demonstrably an act of injustice, as the
other.
To illustrate this by an instance something parallel. It is used as an argument why I may
not exact from one of my neighbours, what was due to me from another, that he and my
debtor are not the same; and that their concerns, interests, and properties are entirely distinct.
Now if this argument be good, it lies as truly against my demanding from him a part of the
debt, as the whole, indeed it is a greater act of injustice for me to take from him the whole
of it, than a part; but not more truly and certainly an act of injustice.
The other divine thinks, there is truly an imputation of Adam’s sin, so that infants cannot
be looked upon as innocent creatures; yet seems to think it not agreeable to the perfections
of God, to make the state of infants in another world worse than a state of non-existence. But
this to me appears plainly a giving up of that grand point of imputation, both in whole and
in part. For it supposes it to be not right, for God to bring any evil on a child of Adam, which
is innocent as to personal sin, without paying for it, or balancing it with good; so that still
the state of the child shall be as good as could be demanded in justice, in case of mere inno-
cence. Which plainly supposes, that the child is not exposed to any proper punishment at
all, or is not at all in debt to divine justice, on account of Adam’s sin. For if the child were
truly in debt, then surely justice might take something from him, without paying for it, or
without giving that which makes its state as good, as mere innocence could in justice require.
If he owes the suffering of some punishment, then there is no need that justice should requite
the infant for suffering that punishment; or make up for it, by conferring some good, that
shall countervail it, and in effect remove and disannul it; so that, on the whole, good and
evil shall be at even balance, yea, so that the scale of good shall preponderate. If it is unjust
in a judge, to order any quantity of money to be taken from another, without paying him
again, and fully making it up to him, it must be because he had justly forfeited none at all.
It seems to me pretty manifest, that none can, in good consistence with themselves, own
a real imputation of the guilt of Adam’s first sin to his posterity, without owning that they
are justly treated as sinners, truly guilty, and children of wrath, on that account; nor unless
they allow a just imputation of the whole of the evil of that transgression; at least, all that
pertains to the essence of that act, as a full and complete violation of the covenant, which
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CHAPTER III. The Imputation of Adam's Sin stated.