to the public good, such a temper exposes a man to act the part of an enemy to the public.
As, in every case wherein his private interest seems to clash with the public; or in all those
cases wherein such things are presented to his view, that suit his personal appetites or private
inclinations, but are inconsistent with the good of the public. On which account, a selfish,
contracted, narrow spirit is generally abhorred, and is esteemed base and sordid. But if a
man’s affection takes in half a dozen more, and his regards extend so far beyond his own
single person as to take in his children and family; or if it reaches further still to a larger
circle, but falls infinitely short of the universal system, and is exclusive of being in general;
his private affection exposes him to the same thing, viz. to pursue the interest of its particular
object in opposition to general existence: which is certainly contrary to the tendency of true
virtue; yea, directly contrary to the main and most essential thing in its nature, the thing on
account of which chiefly its nature and tendency is good. For the chief and most essential
good that is in virtue, is its favouring being in general. Now certainly, if private affection to
a limited system had in itself the essential nature of virtue, it would be impossible that it
should, in any circumstance whatsoever, have a tendency and inclination directly contrary
to that wherein the essence of virtue chiefly consists.
2. Private affection, if not subordinate to general affection, is not only liable, as the case
may be, to issue an enmity to being in general, but has a tendency to it as the case certain is,
and must necessarily be. For he that is influenced by private affection, not subordinate to a
regard to being in general, sets up its particular or limited object above being in general;
and this most naturally tends to enmity against the latter, which is by right the great supreme,
ruling, and absolutely sovereign object of our regard. Even as the setting up another prince
as supreme in any kingdom, distinct from the lawful sovereign, naturally tends to enmity
against the lawful sovereign. Wherever it is sufficiently published, that the supreme, infinite,
and all-comprehending Being requires a supreme regard to himself; and insists upon it, that
our respect to him should universally rule in our hearts, and every other affection be subor-
dinate to it, and this under the pain of his displeasure, (as we must suppose it is in the world
of intelligent creatures, if God maintains a moral kingdom in the world,) then a consciousness
of our having chosen and set up another prince to rule over us, and subjected our hearts to
him, and continuing in such an act, must unavoidably excite enmity, and fix us in a stated
opposition to the Supreme Being. This demonstrates, that affection to a private society or
system, independent on general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For this
would be absurd, that it has the nature and essence of true virtue, and yet at the same time
has a tendency opposite to true virtue.
3. Not only would affection to a private system, unsubordinate to a regard to being in
general, have a tendency to oppose the supreme object of virtuous affection, as its effect and
consequence, but would become itself an opposition to that object. Considered by itself in
its nature, detached from its effects, it is an instance of great opposition to the rightful su-
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CHAPTER II. How love respects different beings.