consider, on the one hand, that it does not require any image fashioned by the imagination
as the vehicle by which it may be introduced into the mind; and, on the other hand, that it
could never enter the mind otherwise than by our remembering it,—we shall see that, in
regard to some things at least, there can be an exercise of memory without any image of the
thing remembered being presented by the imagination.
Chap. II.—The mind is destitute of images presented by the imagination, so long as it has
not been informed by the senses of external things.
3. In the second place, as to your opinion that it is possible for the mind to form to itself
images of material things independently of the services of the bodily senses, this is refuted
by the following argument:—If the mind is able, before it uses the body as its instrument in
perceiving material objects, to form to itself the images of these; and if, as no sane man can
doubt, the mind received more reliable and correct impressions before it was involved in
the illusions which the senses produce, it follows that we must attribute greater value to the
impressions of men asleep than of men awake, and of men insane than of those who are
free from such mental disorder: for they are, in these states of mind, impressed by the same
kind of images as impressed them before they were indebted for information to these most
deceptive messengers, the senses; and thus, either the sun which they see must be more real
than the sun which is seen by men in their sound judgment and in their waking hours, or
that which is an illusion must be better than what is real. But if these conclusions, my dear
Nebridius, are, as they obviously are, wholly absurd, it is demonstrated that the image of
which you speak is nothing else than a blow inflicted by the senses, the function of which
in connection with these images is not, as you write, the mere suggestion or admonition
occasioning their formation by the mind within itself, but the actual bringing in to the mind,
or, to speak more definitely, impressing upon it of the illusions to which through the senses
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we are subject. The difficulty which you feel as to the question how it comes to pass that we
can conceive in thought, faces and forms which we have never seen, is one which proves
the acuteness of your mind. I shall therefore do what may extend this letter beyond the
usual length; not, however, beyond the length which you will approve, for I believe that the
greater the fulness with which I write to you, the more welcome shall my letter be.
4. I perceive that all those images which you as well as many others call phantasiæ, may
be most conveniently and accurately divided into three classes, according as they originate
with the senses, or the imagination, or the faculty of reason. Examples of the first class are
when the mind forms within itself and presents to me the image of your face, or of Carthage,
or of our departed friend Verecundus, or of any other thing at present or formerly existing,
which I have myself seen and perceived. Under the second class come all things which we
imagine to have been, or to be so and so: e.g. when, for the sake of illustration in discourse,
we ourselves suppose things which have no existence, but which are not prejudicial to truth;
or when we call up to our own minds a lively conception of the things described while we
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To Nebridius