so the idea of ungeneracy will be ejected from being the mark of the essence. If, on the other
hand, because God is not subject to destruction, one affirms imperishability to be His essence,
and, because He is stronger than death, one therefore defines immortality to be His very
essence, and if the Son is imperishable and immortal (as He is), imperishability and immor-
tality will also be the essence of the Only-begotten. If, then, the Father is imperishability,
and the Son imperishability, and each of these imperishabilities is the essence, and no differ-
ence exists between them as regards the idea of imperishability, one essence will differ from
the other essence in no way at all, seeing that in both equally the nature is a stranger to any
corruption. Even if he should resume the same method as before, and place us on the horns
of his dilemma from which, as he thinks, there is no escape, saying that, if we distinguish
that which accrues from that which is, we make the Deity composite, whereas if we acknow-
ledge His simplicity, then the imperishability and the ungeneracy are seen at once to be
significative of His very essence—even then again we can show that he is fighting for our
side. For if he will have it that God is made composite by our saying that anything accrues
to Him, then he certainly cannot eject the Fatherhood either from the essence, but must
confess that He is Father by His nature as much as He is imperishable and immortal; and
so without intending it he must admit the Son also to partake of that intimate nature; for it
will not be possible, if God is essentially Father, to exclude the Son from a relationship to
Him thus essential. But if he says that the Fatherhood accrues to God, but is outside the
circle of the substance, then he must concede to us that we may say anything we like accrues
to the Deity, since the Divine simplicity is in no way marred, if His quality of ungeneracy
is made to mean something outside the essence. If, however, he declares that the imperishab-
ility and the ungeneracy do mean the essence, and if he insists that these two words are
equivalent, since, by reason of the same meaning lying in each, there is no difference between
them, and if he thus assert that the very idea of imperishability and ungeneracy is one and
the same, the One who is the first of these must necessarily be the second too. But that the
Son is imperishable, let us observe, even these men entertain no doubt; therefore, by Euno-
mius’ argument, the Son also is ungenerate, if imperishability and ungeneracy are to mean
the same thing. So that he must accept one of two alternatives; either he must agree with us
that ungeneracy is other than imperishability, or, if he abides by his assertions, he must in
various ways speak blasphemy about the Only-begotten, making Him, for instance, perish-
able, in order that he may not have to say that He is ungenerate; or ungenerate, in order
that he may not prove Him perishable.
But now I do not know which it is best to do; to pursue step by step this subject, or to
put an end here to our contest with such folly. Well, as in the case of those who are selling
destructive drugs, a very slight experiment guarantees to the purchasers the destructive
power latent in all the drug, and no one doubts, after he has found out by an experiment its
partial deadliness, that the drug sold is entirely of this deadly character, so I think it can be
573
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.