We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those
who are not divided Reading τοὺς μὴ
διηρημένούς, as Sifanus seems to have read. The Paris Edit. of 1615
reads τοὺς
διηρημένους, which Oehler leaves uncorrected. in nature by the
very name of their common nature in the plural, and saying they are
“many men,” is a customary abuse of language, and that it
would be much the same thing to say they are “many human
natures.” And the truth of this we may see from the following
instance. When we address any one, we do not call him by the name of
his nature, in order that no confusion may result from the community of
the name, as would happen if every one of those who hear it were to
think that he himself was the person addressed, because the call is
made not by the proper appellation but by the common name of their
nature: but we separate him from the multitude by using that name which
belongs to him as his own;—that, I mean, which signifies the
particular subject. Thus there are many who have shared in the
nature—many disciples, say, or apostles, or martyrs—but the
man in them all is one; since, as has been said, the term
“man” does not belong to the nature of the individual as
such, but to that which is common. For Luke is a man, or Stephen is a
man; but it does not follow that if any one is a man he is therefore
Luke or Stephen: but the idea of the persons admits of that separation
which is made by the peculiar attributes considered in each severally,
and when they are combined is presented to us by means of number; yet
their nature is one, at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible
unit, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by
subtraction, but in its essence being and continually remaining one,
inseparable even though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete,
and not divided with the individuals who participate in it. And as we
speak of a people, or a mob, or an army, or an assembly in the singular
in every case, while each of these is conceived as being in plurality,
so according to the more accurate expression, “man” would
be said to be one, even though those who are exhibited to us in the
same nature make up a plurality. Thus it would be much better to
correct our erroneous habit, so as no longer to extend to a plurality
the name of the nature, than by our bondage to habit to transfer Reading with Oehler μεταβιβάζειν, for the μὴ
μεταβιβάζειν
of the Paris Edit. to our statements concerning God the error
which exists in the above case. But since the correction of the habit
is impracticable (for how could you persuade any one not to speak of
those who are exhibited in the same nature as “many
men”?—indeed, in every case habit is a thing hard to
change), we are not so far wrong in not going contrary to the
prevailing habit in the case of the lower nature, since no harm results
from the mistaken use of the name: but in the case of the statement
concerning the Divine nature the various use Sifanus seems to have read ἡ ἀδιάφορος
χρῆσις, as he
translates “promiscuus et indifferens nominum
usus.” of
terms is no longer so free from danger: for that which is of small
account is in these subjects no longer a small matter. Therefore we
must confess one God, according to the testimony of Scripture,
“Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord,” even though
the name of Godhead extends through the Holy Trinity. This I say
according to the account we have given in the case of human nature, in
which we have learnt that it is improper to extend the name of the
nature by the mark of plurality. We must, however, more carefully
examine the name of “Godhead,” in order to obtain, by means
of the significance involved in the word, some help towards clearing up
the question before us.