necessity, or certainty of connexion between antecedent and consequent, must arise form one of these two
cources, viz. the nature of things, or, the decree of god. Chance is nothing; and nothing has no properties, con-
sequently has no causal influence. 3. The necessity which arises from the nature of things, is either absolute or
hypothetical. absolute necessity belongs only to the first cause, or God. He exists absolutely; and to suppose him
not to exist, or not to have exited, is a contradiction. For the supposition itself is made by a confessedly contingent
being; but a contingent being necessarily implies an absolute being, with as much certainty as an effect implies
a cause; and consequently a first cause. 4. The first cause excepted, every other being, or mode of being, or nay
event whatever, is only of hypothetical necessity. Any event is necessary, only on account of its relation to the
first cause. This relation, or necessary connexion, between an event and the first cause, is either in the way of
contrast, or in the way of dependence. 5. There are two things necessarily related to the first cause by way of
contrast; passive power, which is a natural evil—if limited existence, dependence, and insufficiency, in their
necessary tendency, may be so called—and sin, which is a moral evil; or something which, in point of obligation,
ought not to be. 6. The other mode of necessary relation to the first cause, arising from the nature of things, is
a that of dependence. Every contingent being and event must necessarily depend upon god, as an effect depends
upon its cause. Nor is it conceivable without involving the grossest contradiction and absurdity, that any con-
tingent being should continue to exist, any more that begin to exist, independent of the first cause. Sublata causa,
tollitur effectus, is justly entitled to be called an axiom in metaphysical science. 7. It was before observed, that
all necessity must arise either from the nature of things, or from the decree of God. What arises from the nature
of things, as a consequence, has for its antecedent, either an efficient of a deficient cause. 8. A defect, no less that
active efficiency, may be an antecedent, as founded in the nature of things, from whence a corresponding con-
sequence must follow; but there is no defect in any antecedent but may be counteracted by a decree; so far
counteracted, as that the defect shall not be an operative cause. 9. The purposes of God are a series of antecedents,
from whence follow, by the very nature of things, corresponding good consequences, and good only; but the
defect which is inseparable from created existence, considered in itself, is also a cause in the sense of an antecedent;
otherwise a created existence would be as indefectible as the creating of first cause, which involves the most absurd
consequences. 10. Defect is either natural or moral; and each arises from the nature of things, as contradistin-
guished to decree, but in a different manner. natural defect arises from the nature of things in the way of contrast
to God’s natural perfections; which contrast forms the primary difference between creator and creature. 11.
This natural defect is different from defectibility; for defectibility expresses, in strictness, an effect not a cause;
a liableness to defection. But the question returns, what renders a creature liable to defect? To say, Its liableness
to defect, or its defectibility, assigns no true cause: for the question returns as before, what makes it liable, what
makes it defectible? 12. Perhaps there is no term less exceptionable, in order to prevent circumlocution, that
PASSIVE POWER, to express that natural defect, which exists in a created nature as a contrast to the natural
(not the moral) perfections of God. 13. Passive power is as inapplicable to God, as it is applicable to a creature;
for natural perfection is as applicable to him, as natural imperfection is to us.—Therefore to say, that a creature
is not he subject of passive power, is the same as to say, that it is perfect and indefectible in its nature as God is:
which is the grossest pantheism—the deification of every creature, of every atom that exists. 14. All antecedents
originate in either passive power or the divine decrees. From the former proceed, according to the nature of
things, all evil consequences; from the latter, all good. 15. moral defect, is a contrast to the moral perfections,
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SECTION XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral…