28. This in fact was the
reason, when the unsound nature of their phrases had been exposed at
that time, and they were henceforth open to the charge of irreligion,
that they proceeded to borrow of the Greeks the term Unoriginate ἀγένητον. Opportunity will occur for noticing this celebrated word on
Orat. i. 30–34. where the present passage is partly
rewritten, partly transcribed. Mention is also made of it in the De
Syn. 46, 47. Athanasius would seem to have been but partially
acquainted with the writings of the Anomœans, whose symbol it was,
and to have argued with them from the writings of the elder Arians, who
had also made use of it. [On Newman’s unfortunate confusion
of ἀγένητον and ἀγέννητον, see Lightfoot, as quoted in the note on Exp. Fid.
§1. Newman’s reasons are stated in note 7 to Orat. i.
56.], that, under shelter of it, they might reckon
among the things originated and the creatures, that Word of God, by
whom these very things came to be; so unblushing are they in their
irreligion, so obstinate in their blasphemies against the Lord. If then
this want of shame arises from ignorance of the term, they ought to
have learned of those who gave it them, and who have not scrupled to
say that even intellect, which they derive from Good, and the soul
which proceeds from intellect, though their respective origins be
known, are notwithstanding unoriginated, for they understand that by so
saying they do not disparage that first Origin of which the others
come Montfaucon quotes a passage from Plato’s Phædrus, in
which the human soul is called ‘unoriginate and immortal [246
a.];’ but Athan. is referring to another subject, the Platonic,
or rather the Eclectic [i.e. Neo-Platonic] Trinity. Thus Theodoret,
‘Plotinus, and Numenius, explaining the sense of Plato, say, that
he taught Three principles beyond time and eternal, Good, Intellect,
and the Soul of all,’ de Affect. Cur. ii. p. 750.
And so Plotinus himself, ‘It is as if one were to place Good as
the centre, Intellect like an immoveable circle round, and Soul a
moveable circle, and moveable by appetite.’ 4 Ennead. iv.
c. 16. vid. Porphyry in Cyril. contr. Julian. viii. t. ult. p.
271. vid. ibid. i. p. 32. Plot. 3 Ennead. v. 2 and 3.
Athan.’s testimony that the Platonists considered their
three ὑποστάσεις
all unoriginate is perhaps a singular one. In 5
Ennead. iv. 1. Plotinus says what seems contrary to it,
ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ
ἀγέννητος, speaking of his τἀγαθόν. Yet Plato, quoted by Theodoret, ibid. p. 749, speaks of
εἴτε
ἀρχὴν εἴτε
ἀρχάς.. This being the case, let them say the like
themselves, or else not speak at all of what they do not know. But if
they consider they are acquainted with the subject, then they must be
interrogated; for ἐπεὶ
μάλισται, ὅτι
μάλιστα,
Orat. 1. §36. de Syn. §21. fin. ὅταν
μάλιστα,
Apol. ad Const. 23. καὶ
μάλιστα,
de Syn. §42, 54. the expression is not
from divine Scripture Cf.
§18, n. 8., but they are
contentious, as elsewhere, for unscriptural positions. Just as I have
related the reason and sense, with which the Council and the Fathers
before it defined and published ‘of the essence,’ and
‘one in essence,’ agreeably to what Scripture says of the
Saviour; so now let them, if they can, answer on their part what has
led them to this unscriptural phrase, and in what sense they call God
Unoriginated? In truth, I am told And so
de Syn. §46. ‘we have on careful inquiry
ascertained, &c.’ Again, ‘I have acquainted myself on
their account [the Arians’] with the meaning of ἀγένητον.’ Orat. i. §30. This is remarkable, for Athan.
was a man of liberal education, as his Orat. contr. Gent. and
de Incarn. shew, especially, his acquaintance with the Platonic
philosophy. Sulpicius too speaks of him as a jurisconsultus, Sacr.
Hist. ii. 50. S. Gregory Naz. says, that he gave some attention,
but not much, to the subjects of general education, τῶν
ἐγκυκλίων, that he might not be altogether ignorant, of what he
nevertheless despised, Orat. 21. 6. In the same way S. Basil,
whose cultivation of mind none can doubt, speaks slightingly of his own
philosophical knowledge. He writes of his ‘neglecting his own
weakness, and being utterly unexercised in such disquisitions;’
contr. Eunom. init. And so in de Sp. §5. he says,
that ‘they who have given time’ to vain philosophy,
‘divide causes into principal, cooperative,’ &c.
Elsewhere he speaks of having ‘expended much time on vanity, and
wasted nearly all his youth in the vain labour of pursuing the studies
of that wisdom which God has made foolishness,’ Ep. 223.
2. In truth, Christianity has a philosophy of its own. Thus in the
commencement of his Viæ Dux Anastasius says, ‘It is a
first point to be understood, that the tradition of the Catholic Church
does not proceed upon, or follow, the philosophical definitions in all
respects, and especially as regards the mystery of Christ, and the
doctrine of the Trinity, but a certain rule of its own, evangelical and
apostolical.’ p. 20., that the name
has different senses; philosophers
say that it means, first ‘what has not yet, but may, come to
be;’ next, ‘what neither exists, nor can come into
being;’ and thirdly, ‘what exists indeed, but was neither
originated nor had origin of being, but is everlasting and
indestructible Four
senses of ἀγένητον
are enumerated, Orat. i. §30. 1. What is
not as yet, but is possible; 2. what neither has been nor can be; 3.
what exists, but has not come to be from any cause; 4. what is not
made, but is ever. Only two senses are specified in the de Syn.
§46. and in these the question really lies; 1. what is, but
without a cause; 2. uncreate..’ Now perhaps they will wish to
pass over the first two senses, from the absurdity which follows; for
according to the first, things that already have come to be, and things
that are expected to come to be, are unoriginated; and the second is
more absurd still; accordingly they will proceed to the third sense,
and use the word in it; though here, in this sense too, their
irreligion will be quite as great. For if by unoriginated they mean
what has no origin of being, nor is originated or created, but eternal,
and say that the Word of God is contrary to this, who comprehends not
the craft of these foes of God? who but would stone Βαλλέσθωσαν
παρὰ
πάντων,
Orat. ii. §28. An apparent allusion to the punishment of
blasphemy and idolatry under the Jewish Law. vid. [Ex. xix. 13. and] reference to
Ex. xxi. 17, in §27, note 2. Thus, e.g. Nazianzen: ‘While I
go up the mount with good heart, that I may become within the cloud,
and may hold converse with God, for so God bids; if there be any Aaron,
let him go up with me and stand near. And if there be any Nadab or
Abihu, or of the elders, let him go up, but stand far off, according to
the measure of his purification.…But if any one is an evil and
savage beast, and quite incapable of science and theology; let him
stand off still further, and depart from the mount: or he will be
stoned and crushed; for the wicked shall be miserably destroyed.
For as stones for the bestial are true words and strong. Whether he be
leopard, let him die spots and all,’ &c. &c. Orat.
28. 2.
such madmen? for, when they are ashamed to bring forward again those
first phrases which they fabled, and which were condemned, the wretches
have taken another way to signify them, by means of what they call
unoriginate. For if the Son be of things originate, it follows, that He
too came to be from nothing; and if He has an origin of being, then He
was not before His generation; and if He is not eternal, there was once
when He was not The
Arians argued that the word unoriginate implied originate
or creature as its correlative, and therefore indirectly
signified Creator; so that the Son being not unoriginate, was
not the Creator. Athan. answers, that in the use of the word, whether
there be a Son does not come into the question. As the idea of Father
and Son does not include creation, so that of creator and creature does
not include generation; and it would be as illogical to infer that
there are no creatures because there is a Son as that there is no Son
because there are creatures..