interpreted the sacred writings, was inconsistent with human liberty, moral agency, account-
ableness, praise and blame. It was consequently inconsistent with all command and exhorta-
tion, with all reward and punishment. Their interpretation must of course be erroneous,
and an entire perversion of Scripture. How absurd, it was urged, that a man totally dead,
should be called upon to arise and perform the duties of the living and sound—that we
should need a divine influence to give us a new heart, and yet be commanded to make us a
new heart, and a right spirit—that a man has no power to come to Christ, and yet be com-
manded to come to him on pain of damnation! The Calvinists themselves began to be
ashamed of their own cause and to give it up, so far at least as relates to liberty and necessity.
This was true especially of Dr. Watts and Doddridge, who, in their day, were accounted
cxciii
leaders of the Calvinists. They must needs bow in the house of Rimmon, and admit the self-
determining power; which, once admitted and pursued to its ultimate results, entirely over-
throws the doctrines of regeneration, of our dependence for renewing and sanctifying grace,
of absolute decrees, of the saints perseverance, and the whole system of doctrines, usually
denominated the doctrines of grace.—But Mr. Edwards put an end to this seeming triumph
of those, who were thus hostile to that system of doctrines. This he accomplished, by
pointing out the difference between natural and moral, necessity and inability, by showing
the absurdity, the manifold contradictions, the inconceivableness, and the impossibility, of
a self-determining power, and by proving that the essence of the virtue and vice, existing in
the disposition of the heart and the acts of the will, lies not in their cause, but in their nature.
Therefore, though we are not the efficient causes of our own acts of will, yet they may be
either virtuous or vicious; and also that liberty of contingence, as it is an exemption from all
previous certainty, implies that free actions have no cause, and come into existence by mere
chance. But if we admit that any event may come into existence by chance, and without a
cause, the existence of the world may be accounted for in this same way; and atheism is es-
tablished.—Mr. Edwards and his followers have further illustrated this subject by showing,
that free action consists in volition itself, and that liberty consists in spontaneity. Wherever,
therefore, there is volition, there is free action; wherever there is spontaneity there is liberty;
however and by whomsoever that liberty and spontaneity are caused. Beasts, therefore, ac-
cording to their measure of intelligence, are as free as men. Intelligence, therefore, and not
liberty, is the only thing wanting, to constitute them moral agents.—The power of self-de-
termination, alone, cannot answer the purpose of them who undertake its defence; for self-
determination must be free from all control and previous certainty, as to its operations,
otherwise it must be subject to what its advocates denominate a fatal necessity, and therefore
must act by contingence and mere chance. But even the defenders of self-determination
themselves, are not willing to allow the principle, that our actions, in order to be free, must
happen by chance.—Thus Mr. Edwards and his followers understand, that the whole con-
troversy concerning liberty and necessity, depends on the explanation of the word liberty,
407
CHAPTER XXV. Concluding remarks