of choice; it determines its own acts, by choosing its own acts. If the Will determines the Will,
then choice orders and determines the choice; and acts of choice are subject to the decision,
and follow the conduct of other acts of choice. And therefore if the Will determines all its
own free acts, then every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice,
choosing that act. And if that preceding act of the will be also a free act, then by these prin-
ciples, in this act too, the Will is self-determined: that is, this, in like manner, is an act that
the soul voluntarily chooses; or, which is the same thing, it is an act determined still by a
preceding act of the will, choosing that. Which brings us directly to a contradiction: for it
supposes an act of the Will preceding the first act in the whole train, directing and determ-
ining the rest; or a free act of the Will, before the first free act of the Will. Or else we must
come at last to an act of the Will, determining the consequent acts, wherein the Will is not
self-determined, and so is not a free act, in this notion of freedom: but if the first act in the
train, determining and fixing the rest, be not free, none of them all can be free; as is manifest
at first view, but shall be demonstrated presently.
If the Will, which we find governs the members of the body, and determines their mo-
tions, does also govern itself, and determines its own actions, it doubtless determines them
the same way, even by antecedent volitions. The Will determines which way the hands and
feet shall move, by an act of choice: and there is no other way of the Will’s determining,
directing, or commanding any thing at all. Whatsoever the Will commands, it commands
by an act of the Will. And if it has itself under its command, and determines itself in its own
actions, it doubtless does it the same way that it determines other things which are under
its command. So that if the freedom of the Will consists in this, that it has itself and its own
actions under its command and direction, and its own volitions are determined by itself, it
will follow, that every free volition arises from another antecedent volition, directing and
commanding that: and if that directingvolition be also free, in that also the Will is determined;
that is to say, that directing volition is determined by another going before that; and so on,
till we come to the first volition in the whole series: and if that first volition be free, and the
Will self-determined in it, then that is determined by another volition preceding that. Which
is a contradiction; because by the supposition, it can have none before it, to direct or determ-
ine it, being the first in the train. But if that first volition is not determined by any preceding
act of the Will, then that act is not determined by the Will, and so is not free in the
Arminian notion of freedom, which consists in the Will’s self-determination. And if that
first act of the Will which determines and fixes the subsequent acts, be not free, none of the
following acts which are determined by it can be free.—If we suppose there are five acts in
the train, the fifth and last determined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third
by the second, and the second by the first; if the first is not determined by the Will, and so
not free, then none of them are truly determined by the Will: that is, that each of them are
as they are, and not otherwise, is not first owing to the Will, but to the determination of the
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SECTION I. Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of…