Therefore if the conception of
Father and Son is to remain firm and immoveable, he will find no ground
for thinking this interval is infinite: his school must place a
definite interval of time between the Only-begotten and the Father.
What I say, then, is this: that this view of theirs will bring us to
the conclusion that the Father is not from everlasting, but from a
definite point in time. I will convey my meaning by familiar
illustrations; the known shall make the unknown clear. When we say, on
the authority of the text of Moses, that man was made the fifth day
after the heavens, we tacitly imply that before those same days the
heavens did not exist either; a subsequent event goes to define, by
means of the interval which precedes it, the occurrence also of a
previous event. If this example does not make our contention plain, we
can give others. We say that ‘the Law given by Moses was four
hundred and thirty years later than the Promise to Abraham.’ If
after traversing, step by step upwards step
by step upwards. δι᾽
ἀναλύσεως. This does not seem to be used in the Platonic (dialectic)
sense, but in the N.T. sense of “return” or
“retrogression,” cf. Luke xii. 36. Gregory
elsewhere De Hom. Opif. xxv.), uses ἀναλύειν in this sense: speaking of the three examples of Christ’s
power of raising from the dead, he says, ‘you see…all these
equally at the command of one and the same voice returning
(ἀναλύοντας) to life.’ ᾽Αναλύσις thus also came to mean “death,” as a
‘return.’ Cf. Ecclesiastes xi.
7., the
anterior time we reach this end of that number of years, we firmly grasp as well
the fact that, before that date, God’s Promise was not either.
Many such instances could be given, but I decline to be minute and
wearisome.