But I will pass over both this
and their reading of Epicurus’ nature-system, which he says is
equivalent to our conception, maintaining that the doctrine of atoms
and empty space, and the fortuitous generation of things, is akin to
what we mean by conception. What an understanding of Epicurus! If we
ascribe words expressive of things to the logical faculty in our
nature, we thereby stand convicted of holding the Epicurean doctrine of
indivisible bodies, and combinations of atoms, and the collision and
rebound of particles, and so on. I say nothing of Aristotle, whom he
takes as his own patron, and the ally of his system, whose opinion, he
says, in his subsequent remarks, coincides with our views about
conception. For he says that that philosopher taught that Providence
does not extend through all nature, nor penetrate into the region of
terrestrial things, and this, Eunomius contends, corresponds to our
discoveries in the field of conception. Such is his idea of determining
a doctrine with accuracy! But he goes on to say that we must either
deny the creation of things to God, or, if we concede it, we must not
deprive Him of the imposition of names. And yet even in respect to the
brute creation, as we have said already, we are taught the very
opposite (of both these alternatives) by Holy Scripture—that
neither did Adam make the animals, nor did God name them, but the
creation was the work of God, and the naming of the things created was
the work of man, as Moses has recorded. Then in his own speech he gives
us an encomium of speech in general (as though some one wished to
disparage it), and after his eminently abusive and bombastic
conglomeration of words, he says that, by a law and rule of His
providence, God has combined the transmission of words with our
knowledge and use of things necessary for our service; and after
pouring forth twaddle of this kind in the profundity of his slumbers,
he passes on in his discourse to his irresistible and unanswerable
argument. I will not state it in so many words, but simply give the
drift of it. We are not, he says, to ascribe the invention of words to
poets, who are much mistaken in their notions of God. What a generous
concession does he make to God in investing Him with the inventions of
the poetic faculty, so that God may thereby seem to men
more sublime and august, when the disciples of Eunomius believe that
such expressions as those used by Homer for “side-ways,”
“rang out,” “aside,” “mix Reading κέραιρε, according to Oehler’s conjecture, from Iliad ix. 203. All
the Codd. and Editt., read κέκαιρε, however. The Editt., in the Homeric words which follow, show a
strange ignorance, which Gulonius has reproduced, viz. Phocheiri,
Poudese, Ische! (for φῦ
χειρὶ,
Δούπησε,
῎Ιαχε),” “clung to his hand,”
“hissed,” “thumped,” “rattled,”
“clashed,” “rang terribly,”
“twanged,” “shouted,” “pondered,”
and many others, are not used by poets by a certain arbitrary licence,
but that they introduce them into their poems by some mysterious
initiation from God! Let this, too, be passed over, and withal that
clever and irresistible attempt, that it is not in our power to quote
Scriptural instances of holy men who have invented new terms. Now if
human nature had been imperfect up to the time of such men’s
appearance, and not as yet completed by the gift of reason, it would
have been well for them to seek that the deficiency might be supplied.
But if from the very first man’s nature existed self-sufficing
and complete for all purposes of reason and thought, why should any
one, in order to establish this doctrine of conception, humour them so
far as to seek for instances where holy men initiated sounds or names?
Or, if we cannot adduce any instances, why should any one regard it as
a sufficient proof that such and such syllables and words were
appointed by God Himself?