since the generated essence and524 the appellation of Son make such a relation of words
appropriate.” I beg the reader to give his attention carefully to this point, that while he calls
God both “begotten” and “Son,” he refers the reason of such names to “natural order,” and
calls to witness to this conception the knowledge possessed from above: so that if anything
should be found in the course of what follows contrary to the positions he has laid down,
it is clear to all that he is overthrown by himself, refuted by his own arguments before ours
are brought against him. And so let us consider his statement in the light of his own words.
He confesses that the name of “Son” would by no means be properly applied to the Only-
begotten God, did not “natural order,” as he says, confirm the appellation. If, then, one were
to withdraw the order of nature from the consideration of the designation of “Son,” his use
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of this name, being deprived of its proper and natural significance, will be meaningless. And
moreover the fact that he says these statements are confirmed, in that they abide by the
knowledge possessed from above, is a strong additional support to the orthodox view
touching the designation of “Son,” seeing that the inspired teaching of the Scriptures, which
comes to us from above, confirms our argument on these matters. If these things are so,
and this is a standard of truth that admits of no deception, that these two concur—the
“natural order,” as he says, and the testimony of the knowledge given from above confirming
the natural interpretation—it is clear, that to assert anything contrary to these, is nothing
else than manifestly to fight against the truth itself. Let us hear again what this writer, who
makes nature his instructor in the matter of this name, and says that he abides by the
knowledge given to us from above by the instruction of the saints, sets out at length a little
further on, after the passage I have just quoted. For I will pretermit for the time the continu-
ous recital of what is set next in order in his treatise, that the contradiction in what he has
written may not escape detection, being veiled by the reading of the intervening matter.
“The same argument,” he says, “will apply also in the case of what is made and created, as
both the natural interpretation and the mutual relation of the things, and also the use of the
saints, give us free authority for the use of the formula: wherefore one would not be wrong
in treating the thing made as corresponding to the maker, and the thing created to the cre-
ator.” Of what product of making or of creation does he speak, as having naturally the relation
expressed in its name towards its maker and creator? If of those we contemplate in the cre-
ation, visible and invisible (as Paul recounts, when he says that by Him all things were created,
visible and invisible)525, so that this relative conjunction of names has a proper and special
application, that which is made being set in relation to the maker, that which is created to
the creator,—if this is his meaning, we agree with him. For in fact, since the Lord is the
524 Inserting καὶ, which does not appear here in Oehler’s text, but is found in later quotations of the same
passage: αὐτῆς is also found in the later citations.
525 Cf. Col. i. 16
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This third book shows a third fall of Eunomius, as refuting himself, and…