The absence of any a priori law relating
to the authority of Synods applies to general as well as to local
Councils. The conception of a general Council did not give rise to
Nicæa, but vice versa (see above, p. xvii.). The precedent
for great Councils had already been set at Antioch (268–9) and
Arles (314); the latter in fact seems to be indirectly called by S.
Augustine plenarium universæ ecclesiæ concilium; but
the widely representative character of the Nicene Council, and the
impressive circumstances under which it met, stamped upon it from the
first a recognised character of its own. Again and again (de
Decr. 4, 27, Orat. i. 7, Ep. Æg. 5, &c.,
&c.) Athanasius presses the Arians with their rejection of the
decision of a ‘world-wide’ Council, contrasting it (e.g.
de Syn. 21) with the numerous and indecisive Councils held by them. He protests (Ep.
Æg. 5, Tom. ad Ant., &c.) against the idea that any
new creed is necessary or to be desired in addition to the Nicene. But
in doing so, he does not suggest by a syllable that the Council was
formally and a priori infallible, independently of the character
of its decision as faithfully corresponding to the tradition of the
Apostles. Its authority is secondary to that of Scripture (de
Syn. 6, sub. fin.), and its scriptural character is its
justification (ib.). In short, Mr. Gwatkin speaks within the
mark when he disclaims for Athan. any mechanical theory What is
conspicuously true of the Second General Council is in reality not less
true of the First. Its high authority to later ages is due not to its
formal character as a council, but to the character of its work; the
consent of the Church, and that not readily given, but as the result of
a long process of searching and sifting, has given to it its
‘irreformable’ authority. Its authority is expressly put
on a par with that of the Antiochene Synod of c. 269, by
Ath. de Syn. 43 (consult the whole discussion, pp. 473, 475,
&c.). Short of a council which should include every bishop of the
entire Church, in unanimous agreement,—an impossible
contingency,—the claims of any given council to be truly
ecumenical are relative, not absolute; and no consistent theory is
possible of the conditions under which a council could by virtue of
its constitution claim infallibility for its decisions. The
supposed infallibility of general councils lies in reality outside
them, in the authority which sanctions and consecrates their decisions.
According to the precedent of Nicæa this is the Church
‘diffusive’ (cf. p. 489, and Pusey, Councils, p.
225, sq.), and such consent, again, must necessarily be partial
and relative. If a more tangible and expeditious theory is wanted, we
have it in the Roman system, according to which a council is infallible
if ratified by the Pope. This at once puts all such councils, whether
local or general, on one level, and affords a ready criterion. In other
words, the only consistent (mechanical) theory of the infallibility of
councils is one which makes councils superfluous. If such a theory had
been known to the Church in the age of councils, the councils would not
have been held. of conciliar infallibility. To admit this
candidly is not to depreciate, but to acknowledge, the value of the
great Synod of Nicæa; and to acknowledge it, not on the technical
grounds of later ecclesiastical law, but on grounds which are those of
Athanasius himself. (On the general subject see D.C.A. 475–484,
and Hatch, B.L. vii.)