For the plea will not avail them
in their self-defence, that He is delivered by our Lord to His
disciples third in order, and that therefore He is estranged from our
ideal of Deity. Where in each case activity in working good shows no
diminution or variation whatever, how unreasonable it is to suppose the
numerical order to be a sign of any diminution or essential variation Reading ἐλαττώσεώς
τινος ἢ κατὰ
φύσιν
παραλλαγῆς, κ.
τ. λ.! It is as if a man were to see a separate
flame burning on three torches (and we will suppose that the third
flame is caused by that of the first being transmitted to the middle,
and then kindling the end torch “The Ancient Greek Fathers, speaking of this procession,
mention the Father only, and never, I think, express the Son, as
sticking constantly in this to the language of the Scriptures
(John
xv. 26)”—Pearson. The language of the above simile of
Gregory would be an illustration of this. So Greg. Naz., Orat. I. de
Filio, “standing on our definitions, we introduce the
Ungenerate, the Generated, and that which proceeds from the
Father.” This last expression was so known and public, that it is
recorded even by Lucian in his Philopatris, §12.), and were to
maintain that the heat in the first exceeded that of the others; that
that next it showed a variation from it in the direction of the less;
and that the third could not be called fire at all, though it burnt and
shone just like fire, and did everything that fire does. But if there
is really no hindrance to the third torch being fire, though it has
been kindled from a previous flame, what is the philosophy of these
men, who profanely think that they can slight the dignity of the Holy
Spirit because He is named by the Divine lips after the Father and the
Son? Certainly, if there is in our conceptions of the Substance of the
Spirit anything that falls short of the Divine ideal, they do well in
testifying to His not possessing glory; but if the highness of His
dignity is to be perceived in every point, why do they grudge to make
the confession of His glory? As if any one after describing some one as
a man, were to consider it not safe to go on to say of him as well that
he is reasoning, mortal, or anything else that can be predicated of a
man, and so were to cancel what he had just allowed; for if he is not
reasoning, he is not a man at all; but if the latter is granted, how
can there be any hesitation about the conceptions already implied in
“man”? So, with regard to the Spirit, if when one calls Him
Divine one speaks the truth, neither when one defines Him to be worthy
of honour, to be glorious, good, omnipotent, does one lie; for all such
conceptions are at once admitted with the idea of Deity. So that they
must accept one of two alternatives; either not to call Him Divine at
all, or to refrain from subtracting from His Deity any one of those
conceptions which are attributable to Deity. We must then, most surely,
comprehend along with each other these two thoughts, viz. the Divine
nature, and along with it a just idea, a devout intuition Reading καὶ
τῆς εὐσεβοῦς
ἐννοίας., of that Divine and transcendent
nature.