manner towards inanimate things, which gratify self-love, without sense or will, and in an-
other manner towards beings which we look upon as having understanding and will, like
ourselves, and exerting these faculties in our favour, and promoting our interest from love
to us. No wonder, seeing we love ourselves, that it should be natural to us to extend something
of that same kind of love which we have for ourselves, to them who are the same kind of
beings as ourselves, and comply with the inclinations of our self-love, by expressing the
same sort of love towards us.
3. If we should allow that to be universal, that in gratitude and anger there is the exercise
of some kind of moral sense—as it is granted there is something that may be so called—all
the moral sense that is essential to those affections, is a sense of desert—; which is to be re-
ferred to that sense of justice, before spoken of, consisting in an apprehension of that sec-
ondary kind of beauty that lies in uniformity and proportion; which solves all the difficulty
in the objection. Others’ love and kindness to us, or their ill-will and injuriousness, appear
to us to deserve our love or our resentment. Or, in other words, it seems to us no other than
just, that as they love us and do us good, we also should love them and do them good. And
so it seems just, that when others’ hearts oppose us, and they from their hearts do us hurt,
our hearts should oppose them, and that we should desire themselves may suffer in like
manner as we have suffered, i.e. there appears to us to be a natural agreement, proportion,
and adjustment between these things; which is indeed a kind of moral sense, or sense of
beauty in moral things. But, as was before shown, it is a moral sense of a secondary kind,
and is entirely different from a sense or relish of the original essential beauty of true virtue;
and may be without any principle of true virtue in the heart. Therefore, doubtless, it is a
great mistake in any to suppose, that the moral sense which appears and is exercised in a
sense of desert, is the same thing as a love of virtue, or a disposition and determination of
mind to be pleased with true virtuous beauty, consisting in public benevolence. Which may
be further confirmed, if it be considered, that even with respect to a sense of justice or desert,
consisting in uniformity, and agreement between others’ actions, towards us, and our actions
towards them, in a way of well-doing, or of ill-doing, it is not absolutely necessary to the
being of these passions of gratitude and anger, that there should be any notion of justice in
them, in any public or general view of things: as will appear by what shall be next observed.
4. Those authors who hold, that the moral sense, which is natural to all mankind, consists
in a natural relish of the beauty of virtue, and so arises from a principle of true virtue im-
planted by nature in the hearts of all, hold that true virtue consists in public benevolence.
Therefore, if the affections of gratitude and anger necessarily imply such a moral sense as
they suppose, then these affections imply some delight in the public good, and an aversion
of the mind to public evil. And if so, then every time a man feels anger for opposition, or
gratitude for any favour, there must be at least a supposition of a tendency to public injury
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CHAPTER IV. Of self-love and its influence.