and other objects by the different nations that employ them. Which of these, then, tell me,
is the appropriate word wherein the great wisdom of God is manifested? If you prefer the
Greek to the rest, the Egyptian haply will confront you with his own. And if you give the
first place to the Hebrew, there is the Syrian to claim precedence for his own word, nor will
the Roman yield the supremacy, nor the Mede allow himself to be outdone; while of the
other nations each will claim the prize. What, then, will be the fate of his dogma when torn
to pieces by the claimants for so many different languages? But by these, says he, as by laws
publicly promulgated, it is shown that God made names exactly suited to the nature of the
things which they represent. What a grand doctrine! What grand views our theologian allows
to the Divine teachings, such indeed as men do not grudge even to bathing-attendants! For
we allow them to give names to the operations they engage in, and yet no one invests them
with Divine honours for the invention of such names as foot-baths, depilatories, towels,
and the like—words which appropriately designate the articles in question.
But I will pass over both this and their reading of Epicurus’ nature-system, which he
says is equivalent to our conception, maintaining that the doctrine of atoms and empty
space, and the fortuitous generation of things, is akin to what we mean by conception. What
an understanding of Epicurus! If we ascribe words expressive of things to the logical faculty
in our nature, we thereby stand convicted of holding the Epicurean doctrine of indivisible
bodies, and combinations of atoms, and the collision and rebound of particles, and so on.
I say nothing of Aristotle, whom he takes as his own patron, and the ally of his system, whose
opinion, he says, in his subsequent remarks, coincides with our views about conception.
For he says that that philosopher taught that Providence does not extend through all nature,
nor penetrate into the region of terrestrial things, and this, Eunomius contends, corresponds
to our discoveries in the field of conception. Such is his idea of determining a doctrine with
accuracy! But he goes on to say that we must either deny the creation of things to God, or,
if we concede it, we must not deprive Him of the imposition of names. And yet even in respect
to the brute creation, as we have said already, we are taught the very opposite (of both these
alternatives) by Holy Scripture—that neither did Adam make the animals, nor did God
name them, but the creation was the work of God, and the naming of the things created was
the work of man, as Moses has recorded. Then in his own speech he gives us an encomium
of speech in general (as though some one wished to disparage it), and after his eminently
abusive and bombastic conglomeration of words, he says that, by a law and rule of His
providence, God has combined the transmission of words with our knowledge and use of
things necessary for our service; and after pouring forth twaddle of this kind in the profundity
of his slumbers, he passes on in his discourse to his irresistible and unanswerable argument.
I will not state it in so many words, but simply give the drift of it. We are not, he says, to
ascribe the invention of words to poets, who are much mistaken in their notions of God.
What a generous concession does he make to God in investing Him with the inventions of
548
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.