So he says “the manner of
the likeness follows the manner of the generation.” This, when
tested by the exact critic of the meaning of any idea ἐννοίας
λόγον.,
will be found completely unintelligible. It is plainly
impossible to say what a “manner of generation” can mean.
Does it mean the figure of the parent, or his impulse, or his
disposition; or the time, or the place, or the completing of the embryo
by conception; or the generative receptacles; or nothing of that kind,
but something else of the things observed in ‘generation.’
It is impossible to find out what he means. The impropriety and
vagueness of the word “manner” causes perplexity as to its
signification here; every possible one is equally open to our surmises,
and presents as well an equal want of connexion with the subject before
us. So also with this phrase of his “manner of likeness;”
it is devoid of any vestige of meaning, if we fix our attention on the
examples familiarly known to us. For the thing generated is not to be
likened there to the kind or the manner of its birth. Birth consists,
in the case of animal birth, in a separation of body from body, in
which the animal perfectly moulded in the womb is brought forth; but
the thing born is a man, or horse, or cow, or whatever it may chance to
be in its existence through birth. How, therefore, the “manner of
the likeness of the offspring follows the manner of its
generation” must be left to him, or to some pupil of his in
midwifery, to explain. Birth is one thing: the thing born is another:
they are different ideas altogether. No one with any sense would deny
that what he says is perfectly untrue in the case of animal births. But
if he calls the actual making and the actual fashioning a “manner
of the generation,” which the “manner of the
likeness” of the thing produced is to “follow,” even
so his statement is removed from all likelihood, as we shall see from
some illustrations. Iron is hammered out by the blows of the artificer
into some useful instrument. How, then, the outline of its edge, if
such there happen to be, can be said to be similar to the hand of the
worker, or to the manner of its fashioning, to the hammers, for
instance, and the coals and the bellows and the anvil by means of which
he has moulded it, no one could explain. And what can be said in one
case fits all, where there is any operation producing a result; the
thing produced cannot be said to be like the “manner of its
generation.” What has the shape of a garment got to do with the
spool, or the rods, or the comb, or with the form of the weaver’s
instruments at all? What has an actual seat got to do with the working
of the blocks; or any finished production with the build of him who
achieved it?—But I think even our opponents would allow that this
rule of his is not in force in sensible and material
instances.