must also be sinful, being chargeable with all the blame of that consequent evil choice, which
was its effect. And so we must go back till we come to the very first volition, the prime or
original act of choice in the whole chain. And this to be sure must be a sinful choice, because
this is the origin or primitive cause of all the train of evils which follow; and according to
our author, must therefore be “alone chargeable with all the blame.” And yet so it is, according
to him, this “cannot be sinful,” because it does not “proceed from our own choice,” or any
foregoing act of our will; it being, by the supposition, the very first act of will in the case.
And therefore it must be necessary, as to us, having no choice of ours to be the cause of it.
In p. 232. he says, ”Adam’s sin was from his own disobedient will; and so must every
man’s sin, and all the sin in the world be, as well as his.” By this, it seems, he must have a
“disobedient will” before he sins; for the cause must be before the effect: and yet that dis-
obedient will itself is sinful; otherwise it could not be called disobedient. But the question is,
How do men come by the disobedient will, this cause of all the sin in the world? It must not
come necessarily, without men’s choice; for if so, it is not sin, nor is there any disobedience
in it. Therefore that disobedient will must also come from a disobedient will; and so on, in
infinitum. Otherwise it must be supposed, that there is some sin in the world, which does
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not come from a disobedient will: contrary to our author’s dogmatical assertions.
In p. 166. S. he says, “Adam could not sin without a sinful inclination.” Here he calls that
inclination itself sinful, which is the principle from whence sinful acts proceed; as elsewhere
he speaks of the disobedient will from whence all sin comes: and he allows, 132 that “the law
reaches to all the latent principles of sin;” meaning plainly, that it forbids, and threatens
punishment for, those latent principles. Now these latent principles of sin, these sinful in-
clinations, without which, according to our author, there can be no sinful act, cannot all
proceed from a sinful choice; because that would imply great contradiction. For, by the
supposition, they are the principles from whence a sinful choice comes, and whence all
sinful acts of will proceed; and there can be no sinful act without them. So that the first latent
principles and inclinations, from whence all sinful acts proceed, are sinful; and yet they are
not sinful, because they do not proceed from a wicked choice, without which, according to
him, “nothing can be sinful.”
Dr. T. speaking of that proposition of the Assembly of Divines, wherein they assert, that
man is by nature utterly corrupt, &c. 133 thinks himself well warranted, by the supposed
great evidence of these his contradictory notions, to say, “Therefore sin is not natural to us;
and therefore I shall not scruple to say, this proposition in the Assembly of Divines is false.”
But it may be worthy of consideration, whether it would not have greatly become him, before
he had clothed himself with so much assurance, and proceeded, on the foundation of these
132 Contents of Rom. chap. vii. in Notes on the epistle.
133 Page 125.
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PART IV. Containing Answers to Objections.