In the apostolic age, and the generations immediately succeeding,
it was the privilege of every Christian to take part in the public
meetings of the Church in the way of teaching or prophesying, the only
condition being the consciousness of guidance by the Spirit (see
1 Cor.
xiii.). We cannot call this teaching and prophesying preaching in our
sense of the term. The services seem rather to have resembled our
“open prayer-meetings.” Gradually, as the services became
more formal and stereotyped, a stated address by the
“president” (as Justin calls him) became a regular part of
the service (see Justin’s Apol. I. 67), and we may assume
that the liberty of teaching or prophesying in the public meetings did
not now belong to all the members as it had in the beginning. The
sermon, in our sense of the word, seems to have been a slow growth, but
a direct development from this exhortation of the president mentioned
by Justin. The confinement of the speaking (or preaching) to a single
individual,—the leader,—which we see in Justin, is what we
find in subsequent generations quite generally established. It becomes,
in time, the prerogative of the bishop to preach, and this prerogative
he confers upon his presbyters also (not universally, but in most
cases), while deacons and laymen are almost everywhere excluded from
the right. We see from the present chapter, however, that the custom
was not the same in all parts of the Church in the time of Origen. The
principle had evidently before this become firmly established in
Alexandria that only bishops and presbyters should preach. But in
Palestine no such rule was recognized as binding. At the same time, it
is clear enough that it was exceptional even there for laymen to preach
(in the presence of their bishops), for Alexander in his epistle,
instead of saying that laymen preach everywhere and of right, cites
particular instances of their preaching, and says that where they are
qualified they are especially requested by the bishops to use their
gifts; so that the theory that the prerogative belonged of right to the
bishop existed there just as truly as in Alexandria. Origen of course
knew that he was acting contrary to the custom (if not the canon) of
his own church in thus preaching publicly, and yet undoubtedly he took
it for granted that he was perfectly right in doing what these bishops
requested him to do in their own dioceses. They were supreme in their
own churches, and he knew of nothing, apparently, which should hinder
him from doing what they approved of, while in those churches.
Demetrius, however, thought otherwise, and considered the public
preaching of an unordained man irregular, in any place and at any time.
Whether jealousy of Origen’s growing power had anything to do
with his action it is difficult to say with certainty. He seems to have
treated Origen in a perfectly friendly way after his return; and yet it
is possible that the difference of opinion on this point, and the
reproof given by Demetrius, may not have been wholly without influence
upon their subsequent relations, which became in the end so painful
(see chap. 8, note 4).