XI.
That the nature of
mind is invisible.
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1. What then is, in its own
nature, this mind that distributes itself into faculties of sensation,
and duly receives, by means of each, the knowledge of things? That it
is something else besides the senses, I suppose no reasonable man
doubts; for if it were identical with sense, it would reduce the proper
character of the operations carried on by sense to one, on the ground
that it is itself simple, and that in what is simple no diversity is to
be found. Now however, as all agree that touch is one thing and smell
another, and as the rest of the senses are in like manner so situated
with regard to each other as to exclude intercommunion or mixture, we
must surely suppose, since the mind is duly present in each case, that
it is something else besides the sensitive nature, so that no variation
may attach to a thing intelligible.
2. “Who hath known the
mind of the Lord
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?” the apostle
asks; and I ask further, who has understood his own mind? Let those
tell us who consider the nature of God to be within their
comprehension, whether they understand themselves—if they know
the nature of their own mind. “It is manifold and much
compounded.” How then can that which is intelligible be
composite? or what is the mode of mixture of things that differ in
kind? Or, “It is simple, and incomposite.” How then is it
dispersed into the manifold divisions of the senses? how is there
diversity in unity? how is unity maintained in diversity?
3. But I find the solution of
these difficulties by recourse to the very utterance of God; for He
says, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness
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.” The image is properly an image so
long as it fails in none of those attributes which we perceive in the
archetype; but where it falls from its resemblance to the prototype it
ceases in that respect to be an image; therefore, since one of the
attributes we contemplate in the Divine nature is incomprehensibility
of essence, it is clearly necessary that in this point the image should
be able to show its imitation of the archetype.
4. For if, while the archetype
transcends
comprehension, the nature of the image were comprehended, the
contrary character of the attributes we behold in them would prove the
defect of the image; but since the nature of our mind, which is the
likeness of the Creator evades our knowledge, it has an accurate
resemblance to the superior nature, figuring by its own unknowableness
the incomprehensible Nature.
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The
Bodleian
ms.
of the Latin version gives as the
title:—“The definition of the human mind.”
1625
Rom. xi. 34
.
1626
Gen. i. 26
.