But it is time to examine the
argument that leads to this profanity, and see how, as regards itself,
it is logically connected with his whole discourse. For after saying
that it is absurd to compare God with corn and with Christ, he says of
God that He is not, like them, subject to change; but in respect to the
Only-begotten, keeping silence on the question whether He too is not
subject to change, and thereby clearly suggesting that He is of lower
dignity, in that we cannot compare Him, any more than we can compare
corn, with God, he breaks off his discourse without using any argument
to prove that the Son of God cannot be compared with the Father, as
though our knowledge of the grain were sufficient to establish the
inferiority of the Son in comparison with the Father. But he discourses
of the indestructibility of the Father, as not in actuality attaching
to the Son. But if the True Life is an actuality, actuating itself, and
if to live everlastingly means the same thing as never to be dissolved
in destruction, I for myself do not as yet assent to his argument, but
will reserve myself for a more proper occasion. That, however, there is
but one single notion in indestructibility Indestructibility. Such terms (“not-composite,”
“indivisible,” “imperishable”) were the
inheritance which Christian controversy received from the former
struggle with Stoicism. In the hands of Origen, they had been aimed at
the Stoic doctrine of the Deity as that of corporeal Spirit,
which does not perish, only because there is no cause sufficient.
“If one does not see the consequences of such an assertion, one
ought to blush” (in Johann. xiii. 21). The consequences of course
are that God, the Word, and our souls, made in His image, are all
perishable; for all body, in that it is matter, is by the Stoic
assumption, liable to change.,
considered in reference to the Father and to the Son alike, and that
the indestructibility of the Father differs in no respect from that of
the Son, no difference as to indestructibility being observable either
in remission and intension, or in any other phase of the process of
destruction, this, I say, it is seasonable both now and at all times to
assert, so as to preclude the doctrine that in respect of
indestructibility the Son has no communion with the Father. For as this
indestructibility is understood in respect of the Father, so also it is
not to be disputed in respect of the Son. For to be incapable of
dissolution means nearly, or rather precisely, the same thing in regard
to whatever subject it is attributed to. What, then, induces him to
assert, that only to the Ungenerate Deity does it belong to have this
indestructibility not attaching to Him by reason of any energy, as
though he would thereby show a difference between the Father and the
Son? For if he supposes his own created God destructible, he well shows
the essential divergence of natures by the difference between the
destructible and the indestructible. But if neither is subject to
destruction,—and no degrees are to be found in pure
indestructibility,—how does he show that the Father cannot be
compared with the Only-begotten Son, or what is meant by saying that
indestructibility is not witnessed in the Father by reason of any
energy? But he reveals his purpose in what follows. It is not because
of His operations or energies, he says, that He is ungenerate and
indestructible, but because He is Father and Creator. And here I must
ask my hearers to give me their closest attention. How can he think the
creative power of God and His Fatherhood identical in meaning? For he
defines each alike as an energy, plainly and expressly affirming,
“God is not indestructible by reason of His energy, though He is
called Father and Creator by reason of energies.” If, then, it is
the same thing to call Him Father and Creator of the world because
either name is due to an energy as its cause, the results of His
energies must be homogeneous, inasmuch as it is through an energy, that
they both exist. But to what blasphemy this logically tends is clear to
every one who can draw a conclusion. For myself, I should like to add
my own deductions to my disquisition. It is impossible that an energy
or operation productive of a result should subsist of itself without
there being something to set the energy in motion; as we say that a
smith operates or works, but that the material on which his art is
exercised is operated upon, or wrought. These faculties, therefore,
that of operating, and that of being operated upon, must needs stand in
a certain relation to each other, so that if one be removed, the
remaining one cannot subsist of itself. For where there is nothing
operated upon there can be nothing operating. What, then, does this
prove? If the energy which is productive of anything does not subsist
of itself, there being nothing for it to operate upon, and if the Father, as
they affirm, is nothing but an energy, the Only-begotten Son is thereby
shown to be capable of being acted upon, in other words, moulded in
accordance with the motive energy that gives Him His subsistence. For
as we say that the Creator of the world, by laying down some yielding
material, capable of being acted upon, gave His creative being a field
for its exercise, in the case of things sensible skilfully investing
the subject with various and multiform qualities for production, but in
the case of intellectual essences giving shape to the subject in
another way, not by qualities, but by impulses of choice, so, if any
one define the Fatherhood of God as an energy, he cannot otherwise
indicate the subsistence of the Son than by comparing it with some
material acted upon and wrought to completion. For if it could not be
operated upon, it would of necessity offer resistance to the operator:
whose energy being thus hindered, no result would be produced. Either,
then, they must make the essence of the Only-begotten subject to be
acted upon, that the energy may have something to work upon, or, if
they shrink from this conclusion, on account of its manifest impiety,
they are driven to the conclusion that it has no existence at all. For
what is naturally incapable of being acted upon, cannot itself admit
the creative energy. He, then, who defines the Son as the effect of an
energy, defines Him as one of those things which are subject to be
acted upon, and which are produced by an energy. Or, if he deny such
susceptibility, he must at the same time deny His existence. But since
impiety is involved in either alternative of the dilemma, that of
asserting His non-existence, and that of regarding Him as capable of
being acted upon, the truth is made manifest, being brought to light by
the removal of these absurdities. For if He verily exists, and is not
subject to be acted upon, it is plain that He is not the result of an
energy, but is proved to be very God of very God the Father, without
liability to be acted upon, beaming from Him and shining forth from
everlasting.