Cf.
Origen c. Celsum, vi. 65. Celsus had said, “God cannot be
named.” “This requires a distinction to be made. If Celsus
means that there is nothing in the signification of words that can
express the qualities of God, what he says is true, seeing that there
are many other qualities that cannot be named. Who, for instance, can
express in words the difference of quality between the sweetness of a
date and that of a fig? Peculiar individual qualities cannot be
expressed in a word. No wonder, then, that in this absolute sense God
cannot be named. But if by ‘name’ we only mean the possible
expression of some one thing about God, by way of leading on the
listener, and producing in him such a notion about God as human
faculties can reach to, then there is nothing strange in saying, that
God can have a name.”