Chapter 10.—Whether Our Wills are Ruled by Necessity.
Wherefore, neither is that necessity to be feared, for dread of which the Stoics labored
to make such distinctions among the causes of things as should enable them to rescue certain
things from the dominion of necessity, and to subject others to it. Among those things
which they wished not to be subject to necessity they placed our wills, knowing that they
would not be free if subjected to necessity. For if that is to be called our necessity which is
not in our power, but even though we be unwilling effects what it can effect,—as, for instance,
the necessity of death,—it is manifest that our wills by which we live up-rightly or wickedly
are not under such a necessity; for we do many things which, if we were not willing, we
should certainly not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing itself,—for if we will, it
is; if we will not, it is not,—for we should not will if we were unwilling. But if we define
necessity to be that according to which we say that it is necessary that anything be of such
or such a nature, or be done in such and such a manner, I know not why we should have
any dread of that necessity taking away the freedom of our will. For we do not put the life
of God or the foreknowledge of God under necessity if we should say that it is necessary
that God should live forever, and foreknow all things; as neither is His power diminished
when we say that He cannot die or fall into error,—for this is in such a way impossible to
Him, that if it were possible for Him, He would be of less power. But assuredly He is rightly
called omnipotent, though He can neither die nor fall into error. For He is called omnipotent
on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not;
for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot
do some things for the very reason that He is omnipotent. So also, when we say that it is
necessary that, when we will, we will by free choice, in so saying we both affirm what is true
beyond doubt, and do not still subject our wills thereby to a necessity which destroys liberty.
Our wills, therefore, exist as wills, and do themselves whatever we do by willing, and which
would not be done if we were unwilling. But when any one suffers anything, being unwilling
by the will of another, even in that case will retains its essential validity, —we do not mean
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the will of the party who inflicts the suffering, for we resolve it into the power of God. For
if a will should simply exist, but not be able to do what it wills, it would be overborne by a
more powerful will. Nor would this be the case unless there had existed will, and that not
the will of the other party, but the will of him who willed, but was not able to accomplish
what he willed. Therefore, whatsoever a man suffers contrary to his own will, he ought not
to attribute to the will of men, or of angels, or of any created spirit, but rather to His will
who gives power to wills. It is not the case, therefore, that because God foreknew what
would be in the power of our wills, there is for that reason nothing in the power of our wills.
For he who foreknew this did not foreknow nothing. Moreover, if He who foreknew what
would be in the power of our wills did not foreknow nothing, but something, assuredly,
even though He did foreknow, there is something in the power of our wills. Therefore we
Whether Our Wills are Ruled by Necessity.
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Whether Our Wills are Ruled by Necessity.