that the soul was mortal. Aristotle,
guided only by probabilities as discoverable by the syllogism, does
indeed define the soul, “the first entelechy of a physical,
potentially living, and organic body.” Entelechy is more than
mere potentiality: it is “developed force” (“dormant
activity;” see W. Archer Butler’s Lectures, ii. p.
393), capable of manifestation. The human soul, uniting in itself all
the faculties of the other orders of animate existence, is a Microcosm.
The other parts of the soul are inseparable from the body, and are
hence perishable (De Animâ, ii. 2); but the νοῦς exists before the body, into which it enters from without as
something divine and immortal (De Gen. Animal. ii. 3). But he
makes a distinction between the form-receiving, and the
form-giving νοῦς: substantial
eternal existence belongs only to the latter (De Animâ,
iii. 5). The secret of the difference between him and Plato, with whom
“all the soul is immortal” (Phædrus, p. 245 C),
lies in this; that Plato regarded the soul as always in motion, while
Aristotle denied it, in itself, any motion at all. “It is one of
the things that are impossible that motion should exist in it”
(De Animâ, i. 4). It cannot be moved at all; therefore it
cannot move itself. Plotinus and Porphyry, as well as Nemesius the
Platonizing Bishop of Emesa (whose treatise De Animâ is
wrongly attributed to Gregory), attacked this teaching of an
“entelechy.” Cf. also Justin Martyr (ad Græc.
cohort, c. 6, p. 12); “Plato declares that all the soul is
immortal; Aristotle calls her an ‘entelechy,’ and not
immortal. The one says she is ever-moving, the other that she is
never-moving, but prior to all motion.” Also Gregory Naz.,
Orat. xxvii. “Away with Aristotle’s calculating
Providence, and his art of logic, and his dead reasonings about the
soul, and purely human doctrine!”