termining the Will, he must be understood as supposing that the end or aim which governs
in the volition or act of preference, is the avoiding or the removal of that uneasiness; and
that is the same thing as choosing and seeking what is more easy and agreeable.
2. When I say, that the Will is as the greatest apparent good, or, (as I have explained it,)
that volition has always for its object the thing which appears most agreeable; it must be
carefully observed, to avoid confusion and needless objection, that I speak of the direct and
immediate object of the act of volition; and not some object to which the act of Will has
only an indirect and remote respect. Many acts of volition have some remote relation to an
object, that is different from the thing most immediately willed and chosen. Thus, when a
drunkard has his liquor before him, and he has to choose whether to drink it, or no; the
immediate objects, about which his present volition is conversant, and between which his
choice now decides, are his own acts, in drinking the liquor, or letting it alone; and this will
certainly be done according to what, in the present view of his mind, taken in the whole of
it, is most agreeable to him. If he chooses to drink it, and not to let it alone, then this action,
as it stands in the view of his mind, with all that belongs to its appearance there, is more
agreeable and pleasing than letting it alone.
But the objects to which this act of volition may relate more remotely, and between
which his choice may determine more indirectly, are the present pleasure the man expects
by drinking, and the future misery which he judges will be the consequence of it: he may
judge that this future misery, when it comes, will be more disagreeable and unpleasant, than
refraining from drinking now would be. But these two things are not the proper objects that
the act of volition spoken of is next conversant about. For the act of Will spoken of, is con-
cerning present drinking, or forbearing to drink. If he wills to drink, then drinking is the
proper object of the act of his Will; and drinking, on some account or other, now appears
most agreeable to him, and suits him best. If he chooses to refrain, then refraining is imme-
diate object of his Will, and is most pleasing to him. If in the choice he makes in the case,
he prefers a present pleasure to a future advantage, which he judges will be greater when it
comes; then a lesser present pleasure appears more agreeable to him than a greater advantage
at a distance. If on the contrary a future advantage is preferred, then that appears most
agreeable, and suits him best. And so still, the present volition is, as the greatest apparent
good at present is.
I have rather chosen to express myself thus, “that the Will always is as the greatest ap-
parent good,” or “as what appears most agreeable,” than to say “that the Will is determined
by the greatest apparent good,” or ” by what seems most agreeable;” because an appearing
most agreeable to the mind, and the mind’s preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict pro-
priety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary action, which
is the immediate consequence of the mind’s choice, is determined by that which appears
most agreeable, than the choice itself; but that volition itself is always determined by that in
523
SECTION II. Concerning the Determination of the Will.