SECT. III.
The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to suppose those things which
are necessary to be worthy of either Praise or Blame.
It is abundantly affirmed and urged by Arminian writers, that it is contrary to common
Sense, and the natural notions and apprehensions of mankind, to suppose otherwise than
that necessity (making no distinction between natural and moral necessity) is inconsistent,
with Virtue and Vice, Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment. And their arguments
from hence have been greatly triumphed in; and have been not a little perplexing to many,
who have been friendly to the truth, as clearly revealed in the Holy Scriptures: it has seemed
to them indeed difficult, to reconcile Calvinistic doctrines with the notions men commonly
have of justice and equity. And the true reasons of it seem to be the following:
I. It is indeed a very plain dictate of common Sense, that natural necessity is wholly in-
consistent with just Praise or Blame. If men do things which in themselves are very good,
fit to be brought to pass, and attended with very happy effects, properly against their Wills;
or do them from a necessity that is without their Wills, or with which their Wills have no
concern or connexion; then it is a plain dictate of common Sense, that such doings are none
of their virtue, nor have they any moral good in them; and that the persons are not worthy
to be rewarded or praised; or at all esteemed, honoured, or loved on that account. And, on
the other hand, that if, from like necessity, they do those things which in themselves are
very unhappy and pernicious, and do them because they cannot help it; the necessity is such,
that it is all one whether they will them, or no; and the reason why they are done, is from
necessity only, and not from their Wills; it is a very plain dictate of common Sense, that they
are not at all to blame; there is no vice, fault, or moral evil at all in the effect done; nor are
they, who are thus necessitated, in any wise worthy to be punished, hated, or in the least
disrespected, on that account.
In like manner, if things in themselves good and desirable are absolutely impossible,
with a natural impossibility, the universal reason of mankind teaches, that this wholly and
perfectly excuses persons in their not doing them.
And it is also a plain dictate of common Sense, that if the doing things, in themselves
good, or avoiding things in themselves evil, is not absolutely impossible, with such a natural
impossibility, but very difficult, with a natural difficulty; that is, a difficulty prior to, and not
at all consisting in, Will and inclination itself, and which would remain the same, let the
inclination be what it will; then a person’s neglect or omission is excused in some measure,
though not wholly; his sin is less aggravated, than if the thing to be done were easy. And if
instead of difficulty and hindrance, there be a contrary natural propensity in the state of
things, to the thing to be done, or effect to he brought to pass, abstracted from any consid-
eration of the inclination of the heart; though the propensity be not so great as to amount
to a natural necessity; yet being some approach to it, so that the doing of the good thing be
SECTION III. The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to suppose those things which are necessary to be worthy of either Praise or Blame.
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SECTION III. The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to…