How it is possible, then, to
assign one’s gratuities to the non-subsistent, let this man, who
claims to be using words and phrases in their natural force, explain to
the followers of his error. I would not, however, have mentioned this
at all, if it had not placed a necessity upon me of proving our
author’s weakness both in thought and expression. As for all the
passages from the inspired writings which he drags in, though quite
unconnected with his object, formulating thereby a difference of
immortality But
there are two meanings of ἀθάνατος,—and of these perhaps Eunomius was
thinking,—i.e. 1. Not dead; 2. Immortal. In Plato’s
Phædo there is an argument for the immortality of the soul,
certainly not the strongest one, drawn from this. It is assumed there
that the thing, whose nature is such that so long as it exists
it neither is nor can be dead, can never cease to exist i.e. the
soul by virtue of not actually dying, though capable of death, is
immortal. Perhaps this accounts for Eunomius saying (lower down) that
“the perishable is not opposed to the
imperishable.” in angels and in men, I do not know
what he has in his eye, or what he hopes to prove by them, and I pass them
by. The immortal, as long as it is immortal, admits of no degrees of
more and less arising from comparison. For if the one member of the
comparison is, by the force of contrast, to suffer a diminution or
privation as regards its immortality, it must needs be that such a
member is not to be called immortal at all; for how can that be called
absolutely immortal in which mortality is detected by this
juxtaposition and comparison? And to think of that fine hair-splitting
of his, in not allowing the idea of privation to be unvarying and
general, but in asserting, on the contrary, that while separation from
good things is privation, the absence of bad things is not to be marked
by that term! If he is to get his way here, he will take the truth from
the Apostle’s words, which say that He “only hath
immortality 1 Tim. vi. 16.,” which He gives to others. What
this newly-imported dictum of his has to do with his preceding
argument, neither we nor any one else amongst reflecting people are
able to understand. Yet because we have not the mental strength to take
in these scientific subtleties, he calls us “unscientific both in
our judgment as to objects, and in our use of terms”; those are
his very words. But all this, as having no power to shake the truth, I
pass over without further notice; and also how he misrepresents the
view we have expounded of the imperishable, and of the unembodied,
namely, that of these terms the latter signifies the undimensional,
where the threefold extension belonging to all bodies is not to be
found, and the former signifies that which is not receptive of
destruction: and also how he says, that “we do not think it right
to let the shape of these words be lost by extending them to ideas
inapplicable to them, or to imagine that each of them is indicative of
something not present or not accruing; but rather we think they are
indicative of the actual essence”; all this I deem worthy only of
silence and deep oblivion, and leave to the reader to detect for
himself their mingled folly and blasphemy. He actually asserts that the
perishable is not opposed to the imperishable, and that the privative
sign does not mark the absence of the bad, but that the word which is
the subject of our inquiry means the essence itself!