§2. He then discusses the “willing” of the Father concerning the generation of the Son, and
shows that the object of that good will is from eternity, which is the Son, existing in the Father,
and being closely related to the process of willing, as the ray to the flame, or the act of seeing
to the eye.
After these distinctions on our part no one can well be longer in doubt how the Only-
begotten at once is believed to be “of the Father,” and is eternally, even if the one phrase
does not at first sight seem to agree with the other,—that which declares Him to be “of the
Father” with that which asserts His eternity. But if we are to confirm our statement by further
arguments, it may be possible to apprehend the doctrine on this point by the aid of things
cognizable by our senses. And let no one deride our statement, if it cannot find among ex-
isting things a likeness of the object of our enquiry such as may be in all respects sufficient
for the presentation of the matter in hand by way of analogy and resemblance. For we should
like to persuade those who say that the Father first willed and so proceeded to become a
Father, and on this ground assert posteriority in existence as regards the Word, by whatever
illustrations may make it possible, to turn to the orthodox view. Neither does this immediate
conjunction exclude the “willing” of the Father, in the sense that He had a Son without
choice, by some necessity of His Nature, nor does the “willing” separate the Son from the
Father, coming in between them as a kind of interval: so that we neither reject from our
doctrine the “willing” of the Begetter directed to the Son, as being, so to say, forced out by
the conjunction of the Son’s oneness with the Father, nor do we by any means break that
inseparable connection, when “willing” is regarded as involved in the generation. For to our
heavy and inert nature it properly belongs that the wish and the possession of a thing are
not often present with us at the same moment; but now we wish for something we have not,
and at another time we obtain what we do not wish to obtain. But, in the case of the simple
and all-powerful Nature, all things are conceived together and at once, the willing of good
as well as the possession of what He wills. For the good and the eternal will is contemplated
as operating, indwelling, and co-existing in the eternal Nature, not arising in it from any
separate principle, nor capable of being conceived apart from the object of will: for it is not
possible that with God either the good will should not be, or the object of will should not
accompany the act of will, since no cause can either bring it about that that which befits the
Father should not always be, or be any hindrance to the possession of the object of will.
Since, then, the Only-begotten God is by nature the good (or rather beyond all good), and
since the good does not fail to be the object of the Father’s will, it is hereby clearly shown,
both that the conjunction of the Son with the Father is without any intermediary, and also
that the will, which is always present in the good Nature, is not forced out nor excluded by
reason of this inseparable conjunction. And if any one is listening to my argument in no
scoffing spirit, I should like to add to what I have already said something of the following
kind.
He then discusses the “willing” of the Father concerning the generation of the Son, and shows that the object of that good will is from eternity, which is the Son, existing in the Father, and being closely related to the process of willing, as the ray to the flame, or the act of seeing to the eye.
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He then discusses the “willing” of the Father concerning the generation…