Such is our position; our
adversary’s, with regard to the precise meaning of this term i.e. ἀγέννητος, is such as can derive no help from any
reasonings; he only spits forth at random about it these strangely
unmeaning and bombastic expressions ἀλλοκότως
αὐτοῦ τὰς
τοιαύτας
στομφώδεις
καὶ
ἀδιανοήτους
φωνὰς…πρὸς
τὸ συμβὰν
ἀποπτύοντος, in the
framework of his sentences and periods. But the upshot of all he says
is this; that there is no difference in the meaning of the most varied
names. But we must most certainly, as it seems to me, quote this
passage of his word for word, lest we be thought to be calumniously
charging him with something that does not belong to him. “True
expressions,” he says, “derive their precision from the
subject realities which they indicate; different expressions are
applied to different realities, the same to the same: and so one or
other of these two things must of necessity be held: either that the
reality indicated is different (if the expressions are), or else that
the indicating expressions are not different.” With these and
many other such-like words, he proceeds to effect the object he has
before him, excluding from the expression certain relations and
affinities ἐκβαλὼν τοῦ
λόγου
σχέσεις
τινὰς καὶ
παραθέσεις. Gulonius’ Latin is wrong; “protulit in
medium.”, such as species, proportion, part,
time, manner: in order that by the withdrawal of all these
“Ungeneracy” may become indicative of the substance of God.
His process of proof is in the following manner (I will express his
idea in my own words). The life, he says, is not a different thing from
the substance; no addition may be thought of in connection with a
simple being, by dividing our conception of him into a communicating
and communicated side; but whatever the life may be, that very thing,
he insists, is the substance. Here his philosophy is excellent; no
thinking person would gainsay this. But how does he arrive at his
contemplated conclusion, when he says, “when we mean the
unbeginning, we mean the life, and truth compels us by this last to
mean the substance”? The ungenerate, then, according to him is
expressive of the very substance of God. We, on the other hand, while
we agree that the life of God was not given by another, which is the
meaning of “unbeginning,” think that the belief that the
idea expressed by the words “not generated” is the
substance of God is a madman’s only. Who indeed can be so beside
himself as to declare the absence of any generation to be the
definition of that substance (for as generation is involved in the
generate, so is the absence of generation in the ungenerate)?
Ungeneracy indicates that which is not in the Father; so how shall we
allow the indication of that which is absent to be His substance?
Helping himself to that which neither we nor any logical conclusion
from the premises allows him, he lays it down that
God’s Ungeneracy is expressive of God’s life. But to make
quite plain his delusion upon this subject, let us look at it in the
following way; I mean, let us examine whether, by employing the same
method by which he, in the case of the Father, has brought the
definition of the substance to ungeneracy, we may not equally bring the
substance of the Son to ungeneracy.