this one thing, he goes on to add: “Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in
one point, he is guilty of all. For He that said, Do not commit adultery, said also, Do not
kill. Now if thou do not kill, yet, if thou commit adultery, thou art become a transgressor
of the law,” according to that which he had said: “Ye are convinced of the law as trans-
gressors.” Since these things are so, it seems to follow, unless it can be shown that we are to
534
understand it in some other way, that he who says to the rich man, “Sit here,” and to the
poor, “Stand there,” not treating the one with the same respect as the other, is to be judged
guilty as an idolater, and a blasphemer, and an adulterer, and a murderer—in short,—not
to enumerate all, which would be tedious,—as guilty of all crimes, since, offending in one,
he is guilty of all.”
Chap. II.
4. But has he who has one virtue all virtues? and has he no virtues who lacks one? If this
be true, the sentence of the apostle is thereby confirmed. But what I desire is to have the
sentence explained, not confirmed, since of itself it stands more sure in our esteem than all
the authority of philosophers could make it. And even if what has just been said concerning
virtues and vices were true, it would not follow that therefore all sins are equal. For as to
the inseparable co-existence of the virtues, this is a doctrine in regard to which, if I remember
rightly, what, indeed, I have almost forgotten (though perhaps I am mistaken), all philosoph-
ers who affirm that virtues are essential to the right conduct of life are agreed. The doctrine
of the equality of sins, however, the Stoics alone dared to maintain in opposition to the un-
animous sentiments of mankind: an absurd tenet, which in writing against Jovinianus (a
Stoic in this opinion, but an Epicurean in following after and defending pleasure) you have
most clearly refuted from the Holy Scriptures.2749 In that most delightful and noble disser-
tation you have made it abundantly plain that it has not been the doctrine of our authors,
or rather of the Truth Himself, who has spoken through them, that all sins are equal. I shall
now do my utmost in endeavouring, with the help of God, to show how it can be that, al-
though the doctrine of philosophers concerning virtues is true, we are nevertheless not
compelled to admit the Stoics’ doctrine that all sins are equal. If I succeed, I will look for
your approbation, and in whatever respect I come short, I beg you to supply my deficiencies.
5. Those who maintain that he who has one virtue has all, and that he who lacks one
lacks all, reason correctly from the fact that prudence cannot be cowardly, nor unjust, nor
intemperate; for if it were any of these it would no longer be prudence. Moreover, if it be
prudence only when it is brave, and just, and temperate, assuredly wherever it exists it must
have the other virtues along with it. In like manner, also, courage cannot be imprudent, or
intemperate, or unjust; temperance must of necessity be prudent, brave, and just; and justice
does not exist unless it be prudent, brave, and temperate. Thus, wherever any one of these
2749 Jerome, Contra Jovinianum, lib. ii.
1134
To Jerome