" ' Is what you say, then, of a like nature with
that which Plato in Ttmwus hints about the
world, when he says that it is indeed subject to
decay, inasmuch as it has been created, but that
it will neither be dissolved nor meet with the
fate of death on account of the will of God?
Does it seem to you the very same can be said
of the soul, and generally of all things? For
those things which exist after ' God, or shall at
any time exist, ^ these have the nature of decay,
and are such as may be blotted out and cease
to exist ; for God alone is unbegotten and incor-
ruptible, and therefore He is God, but all other
things after Him are created and corruptible.
For this reason souls both die and are punished :
since, if they were unbegotten, they would nei-
ther sin, nor be filled with folly, nor be cowardly,
and again ferocious ; nor would they willingly
transform into swine, and serpents, and dogs ;
and it would not indeed be just to compel them,
if they be unbegotten. For that which is unbe-
gotten is similar to, equal to, and the same with
that which is unbegotten ; and neither in power
nor in honour should tlie one be preferred to
the other, and hence there are not many things
which are unbegotten : for if there were some
difference between them, you would not discover
the cause of the difference, though you searched
for it ; but after letting the mind ever wander to
infinity, you would at length, wearied out, take
your stand on one Unbegotten, and say that this
is the Cause of all. Did such escape the obser-
vation of Plato and Pythagoras, those wise men,'